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THE ELMWOOD EXPERIMENT: THE USE
OF COMMERCIAL RENT STABILIZATION
TO PRESERVE A DIVERSE
NEIGHBORHOOD SHOPPING
DISTRICT
W. DENNIS KEA TING *
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Urban Neighborhood Shopping Districts: The Struggle
for Survival
The plight of the neighborhood shopping district is a well-docu-
mented feature of the literature about the continuing crisis facing many
of America's cities. Beset by a multitude of problems related to the
decline and deterioration of America's inner cities, small neighbor-
hood-based retail and service businesses have struggled to survive in
the face of intense competition from both suburban shopping malls and
revitalized central business districts (CBDs). t The typical problem
that has confronted urban policymakers has been the decline, and often
* Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies, Cleveland State University;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley.
The author was a consultant to Berkeley's Board of Adjustments and Planning and
Community Development Department. This Article reflects solely the opinion of the
author. The author presented previous versions of this research at conferences
sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the American Collegiate Schools
of Planning. The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of Professor Daniel
Mandelker and Kenneth Baar.
1. See generally R. NORTHAM, URBAN GEOGRAPHY (1975).
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abandonment, of small business in the decaying neighborhoods of dis-
tressed inner cities.
1. The Plight of Small Businesses in Depressed Urban
Neighborhoods
During the era of massive clearance-style urban renewal, inner-city
redevelopment often displaced small businesses or hastened their de-
mise.2 It was the loss of an urban neighborhood's "diversity" that Jane
Jacobs lamented in her celebrated plea for the preservation of urban
neighborhoods and her attack on the clearance-style urban renewal
made famous by Robert Moses in New York City.3
Even when the threat of displacement from slum clearance waned
with the ending of the urban renewal programs in the early 1970s, a
combination of urban poverty, crime, and housing abandonment that
undermined the commercial viability of many inner-city shopping ar-
eas threatened many small businesses located in depressed urban neigh-
borhoods. This type of commercial displacement led to the
development of a coordinated federal strategy for neighborhood busi-
ness revitalization as part of the Carter Administration's 1978 National
Urban Policy.4 Despite cutbacks in federal support for neighborhood
2. See B. BERRY, S. PARSONS & R. PLATT, THE IMPACT OF URBAN RENEWAL ON
SMALL BUSINESS: THE HYDE PARK-KENWOOD CASE (1968). The Hyde Park-Ken-
wood neighborhood redevelopment project displaced 447 businesses. Id. at 6. At least
one-quarter of the merchants were displaced involuntarily and approximately one-third
of the businesses were liquidated because of factors such as demolition, the uncompen-
sated costs of relocation, higher post-relocation rents, and loss of customers. The dis-
placees that liquidated generally "operated smaller businesses than those relocating. A
greater proportion of service-type establishments liquidated than did retail units. Most
of the barbers, laundries, places of entertainment, personal service establishments, gro-
cery stores, eating places, and taverns went out of business." Id. at 143. This study
concluded, however, that the liquidation rate of commercial displacees caused by urban
renewal was not excessive. Id. at 133. Some arts and crafts businesses that otherwise
might have been liquidated, survived in a subsidized shopping mall setting within the
project. See also W. KINNARD, JR. & Z. MALINOWSKI, THE IMPACT OF DISLOCATING
FROM URBAN RENEWAL AREAS ON SMALL BUSINESSES (1960); B. ZIMMER, RE-
BUILDING CITIES: THE EFFECTS OF DISPLACEMENT RELOCATION ON SMALL BUSI-
NESSES (1964).
3. See J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). In
the spirit of Jane Jacobs, a "special controlled diverse use district" was proposed for
urban redevelopment. See Mixon, Jane Jacobs and the Law-Zoning for Diversity Ex-
amined, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 314, 335-36 (1967). Mixon proposed that a prescriptive
general zoning ordinance contain general guidelines for permitted and excluded uses in
diverse use districts. Id.
4. See Neighborhood Business District Revitalization: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
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commercial revitalization, successes have occurred.5
2. Displacement of Small Businesses in Gentrifying Neighborhoods
This Article focuses on a different form of displacement that threat-
ens small businesses in revitalized urban neighborhoods. When more
affluent newcomers replace a population composed of low-income, mi-
nority, and elderly residents, the commercial face of "gentrifying"
neighborhoods often changes.
The extent to which gentrification leads to the involuntary displace-
ment of the poor population of revitalized urban neighborhoods and
the costs and benefits of this process of neighborhood change have been
the subject of numerous studies and a continuing debate over whether
local governments should regulate revitalization to prevent residential
displacement.6 In several cities experiencing gentrification, the ques-
tion has arisen whether local governments should protect small, neigh-
borhood-serving businesses, as well as residents, from displacement.
Businesses most vulnerable to displacement typically are commercial
tenants with low-priced or low-volume goods and services that cannot
afford lease renewals accompanied by major rent increases. Unless
comparable, inexpensive, vacant, nearby commercial space is available,
displacement usually means liquidation of the business Relocation is
on Capital, Investment, and Business Opportunities of the House CommL on Small Busi-
ness, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Small Business Administration (SBA) initiated a
Neighborhood Business Revitalization Program in cooperation with the Economic De-
velopment Administration (EDA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD). The National Commission on Neighborhoods later called for just such a
coordinated federal approach. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEIGHBORHOODS, PEO-
PLE, BUILDING NEIGHBORHOODS 148-54 (1979). See generally B. GOLDSTEIN & R.
DAVIS, NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE URBAN ECONOMY: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE
AND REVITALIZATION (1977).
5. See, e.g., No Lost Causes: Salvaging Neighborhood Shopping Districts, 49 PLAN.,
Mar. 1983, at 12. In July 1983, the Berkeley, California City Council adopted a South
Berkeley Revitalization Strategy to promote economic development in a depressed
neighborhood while preventing gentrification-caused displacement. For an argument
for decentralized neighborhood economic development, see McGrath, Who Must
Leave? Alternative Images of Urban Revitalization, 48 J. AM. PLAN A., Spring 1983, at
196.
6. See, e.g., D. GALE, NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION AND THE POST-INDUS-
TRIAL CITY: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1984); J. PALEN & B. LONDON, GEN-
TRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION (1983); M.
SCHILL & R. NATHAN, REVITALIZING AMERICA'S CITIES: NEIGHBORHOOD REIN-
VESTMENT AND DISPLACEMENT (1983); Bryant & McGee, Gentrification and the Law:
Combatting Urban Displacement, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 43 (1983).
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either prohibitively expensive or the business is dependent upon its cur-
rent location for its customers.
Echoing the debate over residential displacement, opponents of com-
mercial regulation argue that both the immediate neighborhood and
the city benefit from the higher rents that follow commercial revitaliza-
tion. They argue that the new businesses provide better goods and
services, landlords and tenants improve the condition and appearance
of commercial buildings, revitalized urban commercial districts attract
suburban shoppers, and the city receives more revenue from increased
real property and sales taxes. Those opposed to the unregulated dis-
placement of small businesses emphasize the destruction of diversity,
the replacement of "mom-and-pop" businesses by chain stores, the loss
of essential services, and traffic problems caused by business expansion,
all of which combine to change the character of gentrifying
neighborhoods.
B. Regulatory Responses
1. Zoning
Land use controls provide the traditional regulatory response to
these problems. Since its inception, American zoning has restricted the
number and type of business uses in commercial districts. Municipal
zoning ordinances often provide for the imposition of conditional use
permits to ensure that land use is compatible with the character of a
neighborhood.7 Courts have upheld the validity of conditional use
zoning against challenges that it is an abuse of the police power, is
inconsistent with comprehensive plans, and constitutes spot zoning.8
Municipalities can enlarge the conditional use concept into special dis-
trict regulation. This is appropriate particularly for controlling uses in
special circumstances. Historic preservation districts provide one
example. 9
7. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 6.48-6.56 (1982).
8. See generally Note, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Inflexi-
bility, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1972). California Boards of Zoning Adjustments are au-
thorized to review and approve applications for conditional use. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65,901 (Deering Supp. 1984).
9. See Wiedl, Historic District Ordinances, 8 CONN. L. REv. 209 (1976). The Cali-
fornia State Historical Resources Commission is empowered to designate historic
landmarks. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5020.4(g) (Deering Supp. 1984). Historic preser-
vation is one of the required elements of local general plans. Cities are required to
identify historic sites and establish programs to protect them. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65,303(j) (Deering 1979). Courts have upheld the constitutionality of historic district
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/3
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2. Rent and Eviction Controls
Zoning regulations may control commercial uses, but they usually
do not protect individual businesses from displacement when a com-
mercial landlord either refuses to renew a lease or demands a major
rent increase from a commercial tenant to renew a lease. In 1982, to
protect small neighborhood-serving businesses, Berkeley, California
voters began an unusual experiment by passing an initiative that placed
Elmwood, a small shopping district of eighty-four stores, under com-
mercial rent stabilization. This Article examines the Elmwood experi-
ment, explores its legal ramifications, compares and contrasts land use
regulations with rent and eviction controls as regulatory policies, and
discusses the national significance of the Elmwood experiment. Berke-
ley is the only American city that currently has adopted commercial
rent stabilization and it is the only American city that has ever enacted
rent and eviction controls that apply only to a single neighborhood.
II. THE ELMWOOD COMMERCIAL RENT STABILIZATION
EXPERIMENT
A. Berkeley's Residential Rent Controls
It is understandable that Berkeley would adopt neighborhood com-
mercial rent stabilization in light of its pioneering adoption of residen-
tial rent controls during the preceding decade. In 1972, Berkeley
became the first California city since World War II to enact rent con-
trols. In 1976, the California Supreme Court held that municipalities
could adopt rent controls by initiative, but found that Berkeley's par-
ticular measure was unconstitutional.10 While a 1977 rent control ini-
tiative was defeated decisively, in 1978 Berkeley voters approved an
initiative which mandated that residential and commercial landlords
rebate eighty percent of their Proposition 13 property tax savings to
their tenants and restrict future rent increases to cost pass throughs. In
regulation. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Maher
v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
10. In Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 173-74, 550 P.2d 1001, 1033,
130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 497 (1976), the California Supreme Court struck down the 1972
initiative because its rent-setting provisions violated landlords' due process rights and
state law had preempted its eviction provisions. See generally Note, The Right to Rea-
sonable Rent Regulation: A Newer Economic Due Process, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 304
(1977); Note, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley: Blueprint for Rent Control in California, 7
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 677 (1977); Note, Towards a Definable Body of Legal Requi-
sites for Rent Control, 10 U.C.D. L. REV. 273 (1977).
19851
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1980, the commercial version of this ordinance lapsed, but a much
stricter rent control initiative superseded the residential version.
Thus, when neighborhood commercial rent control appeared on the
June 1982 ballot, Berkeley voters had voted on rent control measures
four previous times. Berkeley voters, therefore, were familiar with the
arguments in favor of and against rent control. Voters approved the
1982 initiative and further strengthened residential rent control in
Berkeley. The initiative required the election of the Berkeley Rent Sta-
bilization Board instead of the appointment of commissioners by the
Berkeley City Council. In June 1984, Berkeley and Santa Monica be-
came the only American cities with elected rent control boards. 1'
B. Berkeley's Neighborhood Preservation Movement
Berkeley has gained renown for its efforts to preserve its residential
neighborhoods. In 1973, Berkeley voters approved a novel Neighbor-
hood Preservation initiative. 2 The measure required that, when the
construction of new rental housing required the demolition of existing
housing, twenty-five percent of the replacement units must be low-
income.
During the early 1970s, Berkeley down-zoned many residential
neighborhoods to prevent high density construction at the urging of
neighborhood associations affiliated with Berkeley's Council of Neigh-
borhoods. In the late 1970s, these neighborhood groups persuaded the
city to create a controversial system of traffic barriers to divert traffic
from many residential neighborhoods.13 Berkeley also has had a strong
historic preservation movement that has promoted the preservation of
both historic buildings and neighborhoods. Beginning in 1970, and
culminating in a successful 1976 initiative, a community group halted
an industrial urban renewal clearance plan that threatened neighbor-
hood housing and small businesses, and converted the plan into a
mixed-use project featuring historic preservation and subsidized
11. For a discussion of the emergence of rent control in California, see W.D. KEAT-
ING, RENT CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA: RESPONDING TO THE HOUSING CRISIS (1983).
12. BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCE 4641-N.S. (1973). The housing replacement re-
quirement only applies to newly constructed buildings with four or more units. See
Groch v. City of Berkeley, 118 Cal. App. 3d 518, 522-25, 173 Cal. Rptr. 534, 536-39
(1981) (constitutionality upheld).
13. This traffic barrier system has survived several legal and political challenges to
date. See, eg., Rumford v. City of Berkeley, 31 Cal. 3d 545, 645 P.2d 124, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1982).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/3
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housing. 14
C. Concern and Controversy Over Commercial Displacement in the
Elmwood District
In 1982, Berkeley's Elmwood shopping district consisted of eighty-
four businesses concentrated in a small four-block area south of the
University of California campus. These businesses consisted of the fol-
lowing: 1) twenty neighborhood convenience stores and services; 2) six
speciality food stores; 3) eight restaurants; 4) thirty-nine specialty
stores and services; 5) one automotive establishment; and 6) ten offices
and financial institutions.
In the 1970s, Elmwood grew increasingly popular as both a residen-
tial area and as a shopping district. Neighborhood associations became
alarmed at the increased parking problems attributable to Elmwood
shoppers and the expansion of the nearby Alta Bates medical complex.
Several significant changes occurred as a result of pressure primarily
from these neighborhood associations. In 1975, the city amended Elm-
wood's commercial zoning regulations to restrict the total number of
business establishments and to limit the percentage of nonservice uses.
In 1978 and 1981, the Berkeley Planning Commission rezoned Elm-
wood as a restricted neighborhood commercial district "to provide lo-
cations for businesses providing goods and services to serve
surrounding neighborhoods."' 5 The Commission enforced this scheme
through the review of conditional use permits.
In response to increased traffic congestion, the city installed a con-
troversial city-wide system of traffic diverters in Elmwood. 16 The city
established a preferential residential parking permit area in part of the
surrounding residential area. 17 Finally, the city built a small off-street
parking lot in Elmwood. In 1982, after more than a decade of contro-
versy, the city and the private hospital, which was causing develop-
14. In Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley, 80 Cal. App. 3d 158, 171, 143
Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1978), a California appellate court invalidated the initiative. The
city subsequently amended this redevelopment plan to conform with the purpose of the
initiative.
15. BERKELEY COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING DEPARTMENT, ZONING CONTROLS
FOR NEIGHBORHOOD COMMERCIAL DISTRICTS (1977).
16. See supra text accompanying note 13.
17. For a discussion of the constitutionality of neighborhood parking programs, see
generally Miller, Neighborhood Parking Programs: Are They Unconstitutionally Dis-
criminatory?, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 391 (1978).
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mental pressures, agreed to limits on the long-range expansion of
medical uses.
Nevertheless, the commercial gentrification pressures grew. Elm-
wood is immediately surrounded by four census tracts. Between 1970
and 1980, the United States Census revealed a pattern of bifurcation.
The low-income and high-income family and no.n-student unrelated in-
dividual populations in these census tracts generally remained stable or
increased. While the percentage of high-income families rose in two of
four census tracts, the percentage of very low-income unrelated indi-
viduals also rose.'" Therefore, as of 1980, no residential gentrification
trend indicative of higher income exclusively leading to changing con-
sumption was discernible.
While much of the increase in Elmwood business activity came from
these adjacent neighborhoods, a significant percentage was attributable
to nonresident shoppers. A 1982 planning survey commissioned by the
city divided Elmwood's businesses into two categories: "neighborhood
establishments" and "region-serving businesses."' 9 The survey reveals
that sixty-three percent of Elmwood shoppers interviewed lived within
one-half mile of the district and sixty-nine percent of shopping visits
were to neighborhood-serving establishments.20 This does not confirm
that Elmwood had become a regionally-based retail district. Neverthe-
less, the Elmwood area had grown in popularity and sales.
The city's planning consultants listed the following citizen concerns
about the problems of the Elmwood district: 1) the potential loss of
basic neighborhood shops and services (hardware, drug, general food);
2) a trend toward speciality shops and services (boutiques, gourmet
restaurants, financial services); 3) the potential increase in absentee
owners, chains, or franchises; 4) the potential for high-volume, high-
impact uses (discount records, clothing, drug, large restaurants) that
18. LANDAU, GENTRIFICATION AND POPULATION CHANGE IN BERKELEY: AN
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS, table 8, at 21, table 10, at 32 (1983).
19. BLAYNEY-DYETT, ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENTS STUDIES: NORTH
SHATTUCK AND ELMWOOD COMMERCIAL AREAS-WORKING PAPER #2: EXISTING
CONDITIONS: EVALUATION OF CANDIDATE SOLUTIONS 3 (1982).
Neighborhood establishments are defined as convenience stores and services, spe-
cialty food store[s], banks and savings and loans, and some specialty shops and
services including book store[s], [camera] and photography [supply stores], flower
and plant shops, and hardware and houseware stores. Restaurants, all other speci-
ality shops and services, automotive services, and offices and financial institutions
are classified for this analysis as region-serving business.
Id.
20. Id. at 4.
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would be heavy parking and traffic generators; 5) the potential for inva-
sion of shopping centers or malls on larger parcels if owners subdivided
space for the maximum number of small shops; 6) a trend toward
higher-priced shops as landlords increased rents; 7) the potential for
establishment of variously defined "out of character" businesses; 8) the
potential for loss of retail sidewalk merchants; and 9) the potential loss
of the present variety of small shops and services.21 These concerns
reflect the desire for commercial diversity expressed by Jane Jacobs.
The consultants concluded that "[i]f current market forces prevail,
many businesses with low rent-paying capability will disappear or
relocate."22
The gentrification opponents focused on escalating rents as the
causal force for the present and future displacement of Elmwood's
older, low-rent businesses. Typically, commercial leases are long-term
and often have rent escalator clauses tied to the inflation rate.23 The
pattern of Elmwood leases varies from month-to-month (twenty per-
cent), two to three years (twenty-nine percent), four to nine years
(forty-three percent), and ten years or longer (nine percent).24 Rent
levels vary considerably. In 1982, commercial rents ranged from a low
of fifteen cents per square foot to a high of one dollar thirty-two cents
per square foot.25
In the State of California, the impact of property tax increases lead-
ing to greatly increased commercial rents through "pass through"
clauses was reduced significantly as a result of the 1978 passage of the
Proposition 13 state-wide tax initiative. As applied to commercial
landlords and tenants, a very low ceiling was created, even when the
building is sold.26 Approximately half of Elmwood's landlords pay
property taxes. Conversely, approximately half of the tenants pay
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 26.
23. In Elmwood, this is the San Francisco-Oakland Consumer Price Index-All
Items (CPI-U).
24. K. BAAR & W.D. KEATING, ELMWOOD LANDLORD AND TENANT SURVEY:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO THE BERKELEY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS, table 1, at 2
(1983).
25. Id. table 3, at 3.
26. Proposition 13 reduced property taxes to their 1975 level and imposed constitu-
tional ceilings of 1% of full cash value and 2% on annual increases, unless a local
override is approved by a two-thirds vote on a tax referendum. CAL. CONST. art. 13A.
Berkeley voters approved such a measure in 1980 to finance the city's libraries in the
wake of Proposition 13 budgetary cutbacks.
1985]
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property taxes themselves.27 Increased property taxes in the wake of
Proposition 13 are not the main factor in rent increases.
Between 1978 and 1981, seventy-one percent of the tenants reported
receiving rent increases. Including tenants that received more than one
increase during this period and those that reported none, the cumula-
tive average rent increase during this three year period was 27.9 per-
cent.2" During the same period, the regional All Urban Consumer
Price Index (CPI-U) increased by 45.1 percent.29 As Table I indicates,
if only tenants reporting rent increases are included, however, average
rent increases exceeding the CPI-U are found in each year and re-
ported average rent increases grew annually.
Table 1
Average Percentage Rent Increases
Only for Units Reporting Rent Increases: 1979-198130
1979 1980 1981
Number of Units
Reporting Rent Increases 9 15 21
Unweighted Average Percentage
Rent Increase 11%* 16.8% 17.5%
Percent Increase
(San Francisco-Oakland, CPI-U) 8.5% 15.2% 12.8%
*Two tenants reported decreases averaging 4.6%.
In 1982, three tenants reported rent increases in excess of one hundred
percent. A similar rent increase the previous year of a popular Elm-
wood business sparked the movement to preserve Elmwood's small
businesses from commercial gentrification.
The analytical problem presented by this limited data is that no
benchmark exists with which to compare it. There is no comparable
data on the terms of commercial leases and rent increases for small
retail and service businesses elsewhere in Berkeley, Berkeley's neigh-
boring communities, and the region as a whole. Data on downtown
office space rents is not useful for comparative analysis because this
27. K. BAAR & W.D. KEATING, supra note 24, table 2, at 3. Approximately 60%
of Elmwood's commercial tenants responded.
28. Id. table 4, at 4.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. table 6, at 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/3
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affects a far different commercial sector that is not threatened similarly
with displacement by the levels of commercial rents and rent increases.
Moreover, no systematic data exist on the relocation and liquidation
rate of small businesses comparable to those located in the Elmwood
district. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude with any assurance that
the prevailing rents in Elmwood in 1981 were excessively high or that
actual or threatened rent increases displaced small businesses from the
neighborhood.
Nevertheless, many merchants and concerned residents held this
view. The doubling by new owners of the rent of the city's last surviv-
ing soda fountain, a subtenant for more than thirty years in a building
purchased in 1981, received widespread publicity and provoked a tre-
mendous controversy. The prospective closing of this landmark neigh-
borhood business inspired the formation of the Elnwood Preservation
Alliance, which pressured the Berkeley City Council and Planning
Commission for further protective regulation to preserve the existing
small businesses in this district.
D. Alternate Solutions
1. Zoning
The city's planning consultants stated that the city could best pre-
serve Elmwood's neighborhood-serving character by: 1) limiting total
commercial area; 2) limiting floor area per establishment; 3) establish-
ing quotas for banks, savings and loans, and restaurants; 4) establishing
inclusionary regulations to create opportunities for needed services that
have low rent-paying capability; and 5) excluding certain types of of-
fices and office frontage. 31 The planning consultants recommended re-
zoning Elmwood: 1) to limit the space occupied by certain types of
businesses that generate high traffic volumes and businesses that might,
if not limited, expand to displace businesses needed to serve surround-
ing neighborhoods; 2) to prevent development of commercial space ex-
ceeding the amount and intensity of use that can be served by available
traffic capacity and existing and potential parking supply; 3) to ensure
that additional commercial development is accompanied by residential
development sufficient to accommodate the net increase in workforce;
4) to encourage businesses with moderate rent-paying capability that
provide needed household repair services; and 5) to ensure that new
31. BLAYNEY-DYETT, ZONING ORDINANCE AMENDMENTS STUDIES: NORTH
SHATTUCK AND ELMWOOD COMMERCIAL AREAS: FINAL REPORT 2 (1982).
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buildings, alterations, and additions to existing buildings harmonize
with their surroundings.3 2
Zoning controls are the typical response to this type of conflict. The
cited proposals are aimed at restricting occupancy of existing and new
space by those businesses that are not neighborhood-oriented and cause
traffic problems. Zoning achieves this through use and building per-
mits issued in conformity with zoning standards for the district.
This approach will not necessarily preserve existing small businesses,
the focus of the furor. Zoning may protect them against certain com-
petitors, but not all. Zoning does not protect existing small businesses
against the nonrenewal of expiring leases or very large rent increases
that may force them to relocate or to liquidate.
The only part of the rezoning proposal that directly addressed the
rent-gentrification issue contained an "inclusionary" approach to
newly-developed commercial space. This approach, however, was
dropped from the final rezoning ordinance. This proposal would have
required certain owners to offer below-market rents for at least two
years to certain types of tenants providing "household repair serv-
ices."3 Berkeley and other California municipalities have used this
"inclusionary" housing approach to regulate new residential housing
development and condominium conversions to provide more affordable
housing.34 The proposal would have had little or no effect on most
32. BLAYNEY-DYETT, supra note 19, at 13.
33. The proposal stated:
The owner of new, added, or converted commercial space exceeding 6,000 square
feet on a site shall, prior to initial occupancy of the premises, offer during a period
of 60 days or more leases of two years or longer for up to 10 percent of the gross
floor area for occupancy by businesses having as their principal source of income
on-premises repair of shoes, small household appliances, jewelry, bicycles, or cloth-
ing alterations at a rent per square foot not exceeding 50 percent of the average
base rental obtained or sought for all other rental space on the site. Such leases
may contain provisions allowing total rent per square foot to rise to the average for
the site. Such leases may contain provisions allowing total rent per square foot to
rise to the average for the site after one year if sales volume per square foot equals
or exceeds the average for the site.
Id. at 25.
34. Many California cities have adopted inclusionary zoning policies to promote
more affordable housing. Berkeley led the way by passing the Neighborhood Preserva-
tion initiative in 1973. See supra text accompanying note 12. See generally A. MAL-
LACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1984);
Burton, California Legislature Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning, Mandates Fair Share: In-
clusionary Housing Programs a Likely Response, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 19 (1981);
Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
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Elmwood businesses, however, because they occupy existing space.
One large rehabilitation project contains several small shops and of-
fices. Even this major development would not have been affected by
rezoning because of the "grandfathering" of its "vested" development
rights.35
In November 1982, Berkeley, by initiative, enacted the neighbor-
hood sponsored "Neighborhood Commercial Preservation Ordinance"
(Measure V).36 This initiative was designed to require commercial zon-
ing to conform to the city's 1977 Master Plan to encourage regional
businesses to locate in Berkeley's CBD, and to allow for greater neigh-
borhood participation in the city's review of use permits in neighbor-
hood commercial districts. In May 1984, the Berkeley City Council,
on the recommendation of the Planning Commission, adopted the re-
zoning proposal for Elmwood.37 The rezoning of Elmwood represents
the intended effect of Measure V and includes many of the consultants'
recommendations. It establishes use limitations and quotas for a three
year period, and limited development densities and uses to promote
neighborhood-serving businesses and to prevent traffic problems. 38 Be-
cause this is district zoning, which is consistent with the city's Master
Plan, it is not subject to the legal attacks directed at conditional use
35. This project already had received all necessary construction permits and con-
struction was completed prior to approval by the Berkeley City Council of the rezoning
of Elmwood in November 1983. Thus, no issue of the vesting of development rights
would have arisen concerning this project. See generally Recent Development, Develop-
ers' Vested Rights, 23 URBAN L. ANN. 487 (1982).
36. BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCE 5506-N.S. (1982). The rezoning of Elmwood
became effective July 19, 1984, more than two years after the passage of Measure I. See
infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
37. BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCE 5603-N.S. (1983).
38. Its purposes include:
To maintain a scale and balance of retail goods and services in the district to com-
patibly serve the everyday needs of surrounding neighborhoods by:
I. providing locations for retail goods and service establishments to serve sur-
rounding neighborhoods;
2. preventing development which exceeds the amount and intensity of use that is
compatible with adjacent residential neighborhoods;
3 limiting the space occupied by businesses that generate high traffic and/or
parking demands;
4. controlling the proliferation of establishments which, if not limited, might ex-
pand to displace establishments needed to serve surrounding neighborhoods;
and
5. permitting other uses which serve this objective.
Id. § 9 D.I.
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permits that are unsupported by zoning.
39
San Francisco also has utilized this approach. San Francisco has
experienced considerable gentrification-both residential and commer-
cial.4 After the San Francisco Department of City Planning com-
pleted the neighborhood Commercial Conservation and Development
Study in 1980, San Francisco established ten interim Neighborhood
Commercial Special Use Districts.41 The planning department estab-
lishect density thresholds for specified businesses to protect neighbor-
hood-serving retail service businesses. Any business exceeding these
thresholds must obtain a special use permit.
In May 1984, the San Francisco Department of City Planning re-
leased proposed amendments to the Master Plan in the form of a
Neighborhood Commercial section of the Commerce and Industry ele-
ment of the city's Master Plan. The Department proposed the perma-
nent establishment of neighborhood commercial district zoning
controls to promote diversity among the city's neighborhood commer-
cial districts, while assuring that each district continues to provide
neighborhood-serving goods and services.42 The Department proposed
39. California requires that zoning ordinances be consistent with general plans.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65,860 (Deering 1979). California courts have exempted condi-
tional use permits from the consistency requirement. Hawkins v. County of Marin, 54
Cal. App. 3d 586, 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754, 760-61 (1976). For an analysis of the
consistency doctrine, see DiMento, Developing the Consistency Doctrine: The Contribu-
tion of the California Courts, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285 (1980); DiMento, Improv-
ing Development Control Through Planning: The Consistency Doctrine, 5 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1978); DiMento, Mandating Consistency Between General Plans and Zon-
ing Ordinances: The California Experience, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 455 (1976).
40. See generally HARTMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SAN FRANCISCO (1984).
41. See Cohen, San Francisco's Neighborhood Commercial Special Use District Ordi-
nance: An Innovative Approach to Commercial Gentrification, 13 GOLDEN GATE L.
REv. 367, 369 (1983).
42. See SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, NEIGHBORHOOD
COMMERCIAL REZONING STUDY, May 1984, at 10. The Department explained this
policy:
A function common to all neighborhood commercial districts is the provision of
a variety of goods and services at affordable prices to meet the convenience needs of
residents in adjacent neighborhoods. Many commercial districts also provide spe-
cialty goods and services to a larger, often city-wide trade area.
One of the unique charms of San Francisco is the diversity of its neighborhood
shopping areas. The distinctive ethnic and lifestyle characteristics of different dis-
tricts are a reflection of the needs, interests and tastes of the city's varied and ever
changing population. The differing sizes of lots and blocks, and the scale and ar-
chitectural style of buildings in various districts contribute also to their diversity.
The variation in function and character of commercial districts should be recog-
nized through zoning whose controls on building form, scale, commercial use, and
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to protect the creation of another fifteen special neighborhood commer-
cial districts against over-development through this type of zoning.4 3
This city-wide rezoning proposal remains under public review.
Like its Berkeley counterparts-Measure V and the rezoning of
Elmwood-this policy does not protect directly the existing commer-
cial tenants within protected neighborhood commercial districts from
displacement. Instead, the policy restricts the use of properties within
the district to promote diversity and neighborhood-serving businesses.
2. Historic Preservation
Recognizing that rezoning alone might not satisfy the concerns ex-
pressed by the Elmwood Preservation Alliance, the consultants also
suggested classifying Elmwood as an historical preservation district.
This recognizes the continuing effort of the Elmwood Landmarks
Committee to designate Elmwood as an historic district.' Historic
operation reflect the differences between districts and reinforce the variations in
individual land use patterns.
The essential character of neighborhood commercial districts should be pre-
served by discouraging uses which would be incompatible in scale or type with the
district in which they are to be located. And while it is important to preserve and
maintain the unique qualities of the various neighborhood commercial districts,
districts should also be allowed to evolve over time in response to changes in the
neighborhoods they serve and in consumer tastes and preferences.
The determination of the appropriateness of a proposed land use in a certain
district should include consideration of the following basic aspects:
-Individual district character;
-Customer orientation of the district;
-Residential community living within and adjacent to the district;
-Necessity and desirability of the proposed use to the community; and
-Environmental impacts of the proposed use.
Id. at 10-11.
43. The proposed rezoning would limit the type and number of specified neighbor-
hood-serving uses in Neighborhood Commercial Districts classified as follows:
NC-1 Neighborhood Commercial Cluster District;
NC-2 Small-Scale Neighborhood Commercial District;
NC-3 Moderate-Scale Neighborhood Commercial District; and
NC-4 Neighborhood Commercial Shopping Center District.
Id. at 53-279.
44. Commercial districts are recognized as historic sites throughout the country.
Often, this results in the imposition of zoning controls designed to promote the preser-
vation or restoration of the visual design of the designated buildings. See supra note 9.
These aesthetic controls have not included price controls like those embodied by Mea-
sure I. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, REMEMBER THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: CONSERVING NEIGHBORHOODS THROUGH HISTORIC PRESERVA-
TION TECHNIQUES (1981).
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landmark designation is not likely to prevent displacement of existing
businesses. Historic district status, which is used in many cities, does
not guarantee continuing occupancy to existing commercial tenants.
3. Commercial Rent Stabilization
a. The Proposed Initiative
While supporting both rezoning and historic district designation, the
Elmwood Preservation Alliance concluded that neither policy was suf-
ficient to protect existing neighborhood businesses. Therefore, they
proposed and placed on the June 1982 ballot an initiative entitled the
"Elmwood Commercial Rent Stabilization and Eviction Protection Or-
dinance," more commonly known as Measure I. Measure I's stated
purposes are: 1) to protect commercial tenants in the Elmwood district
from rent increases that are not justified by landlord's cost increases;
2) to enable those tenants to continue serving residents of the Elmwood
district without undue price increases, expansion of trade (which may
exacerbate parking problems), or going out of business; and 3) to test
the viability of commercial rent stabilization as a means of preserving
businesses that serve the needs of local residents in Berkeley neighbor-
hoods outside the downtown business district.45 To accomplish these
purposes, all commercial premises within the Elmwood district, includ-
ing newly-constructed and rehabilitated units, are subject to rent and
eviction regulation.
Measure I establishes a base rent date of October 1, 1981.46 Leases
remain unaffected until expiration of the lease.47 An exception is pro-
vided for pre-existing leases executed within one year prior to the base
rent date under which landlords increased the rent more than the in-
crease in the regional CPI-U. Measure I reduces these rent increases to
the level of the CPI-U increase for that period.48 If the landlord did
not raise the rent under a fixed payment lease within the year prior to
the base date, the landlord is entitled to a five percent annual increase
in the base rent for each year prior to the effective data of the ordinance
in which the landlord did not raise the rent.49
45. BERKELEY, CAL. ORDINANCE 5468-N.S. (1982) [hereinafter cited as MEASURE
I]. For the full text of MEASURE I, see APPENDIX, infra p. 112.
46. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 5(b).
47. Id. § 13(a).
48. Id. § 13(b).
49. Id. § 5(b)(iii).
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Landlords are entitled to increased rents based on the following
specified cost increases: 1) maintenance and operating expenses;
2) property taxes; 3) fees; and 4) improvements (amortized over their
useful life).5" Increases in debt service, which consists of principal and
interest charges, can be passed on to tenants for financing capital im-
provements, but not for refinancing or purchase financing.51 Land-
lords may increase rents after giving tenants written notice and
informing them of the cost increases involved.52
In addition, landlords are guaranteed "a fair and reasonable return
on investment., 53 Administration of this provision is delegated to
Berkeley's Board of Adjustments (BBA)-a zoning board of appeals
appointed by the Berkeley City Council-rather than to the city's in-
dependent Rent Stabilization Board. Measure I requires the BBA to
enact fair return regulations.54
Landlords may not evict tenants except for eight specified reasons.55
Measure I prohibits retaliatory eviction, uncompensated reduction of
services, and unreasonable refusals to permit lease assignments by
landlords.56 Lease waivers of protected tenant rights are deemed
invalid.57
Measure I designates the BBA as the agency for resolution of land-
lord and tenant disputes.5" Tenants, the city, any interested party, or
any neighborhood organization may sue any landlord that intention-
ally overcharges tenants. 9 Landlords found in violation are subject to
both actual damages and treble, punitive damages."
While Measure I contains no sunset clause, the BBA may recom-
mend that the City Council place amendments on the ballot.6 In addi-
50. Id. § 5(c)(i).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 5(c)(iv).
53. Id. § 6(a).
54. Id. § 6(c).
55. Id. § 9. See generally Note, Just Cause Eviction: Limiting a Landlord's Ability
to Evict, 11 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 71 (1983).
56. MEASURE I, supra note 45, §§ 7, 10. In the past, California landlords were not
required to permit tenant lease assignments. See Comment, The Approval Clause in a
Lease: Toward a Standard of Reasonableness, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 681, 683 (1983).
57. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 12.
58. Id. § 8.
59. Id. §§ 11(b), (c).
60. Id. §§ 11(a), (b).
61. Id. § 8(h).
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tion, the Berkeley Comprehensive Planning Department is required to
report annually on the impact and effectiveness of the ordinance. In its
report, the Department may make recommendations concerning
whether the City Council should leave the ordinance in operation, re-
peal it, or whether the City Council should expand the ordinance to
include other neighborhood shopping districts in the City of Berkeley
outside the downtown business district.62
b. The Campaign
The Save Our Shops Committee, supported by other neighborhood
groups, waged a successful campaign to enact Measure I. The Com-
mittee emphasized neighborhood preservation and protection for small
businesses against displacement caused by speculation. Zoning was re-
jected as a viable alternative.
Opponents, including the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce, argued
that commercial rent stabilization was unnecessary, would deter com-
mercial investment, would not protect existing small businesses against
displacement, and would require overly expensive administration.
Berkeley's two major political factions split over the initiative. Mea-
sure I passed by a resounding fifty-eight to forty-two percent margin on
June 8, 1982. This unique regulatory experiment raised many adminis-
trative and legal issues, which are reviewed below. Many issues are
similar to those long associated with residential rent control and the
continuing controversy over its necessity and impact. These issues
have been explored by proponents and opponents-including planners
and economists-and by the courts, whose assessments and conclu-
sions are relevant to the Elmwood experiment.63
III. COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL PRECEDENTS
Two commercial rent control precedents for Berkeley's Elmwood
experiment are noteworthy: New York City and Berkeley itself. Al-
bany, New York, also briefly instituted commercial rent control in
1948.64
62. Id. § 16.
63. See supra note 11.
64. See 1948 N.Y. Laws ch. 679. See also B. FRIEDLANDER & A. CURRIERI, RENT
CONTROL: FEDERAL, STATE, AND MUNICIPAL § 115 (1948).
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A. New York City: 1945-1963
1. Statutory Structure
In 1945, New York State determined that emergency conditions at-
tributable to World War II existed in New York City's commercial
rental sector. The state enacted two companion laws to control rents:
the Emergency Commercial Space Rent Control Law that was applica-
ble to commercial space other than stores and offices,65 and the Emer-
gency Business Space Rent Control Law that was applicable to stores
and offices.66 New York's experience with commercial rent control
from 1945 to 1963 offers the only sustained precedent for commercial
rent control in American history. In view of recently renewed efforts
to revive commercial rent control in New York City to protect small
businesses from displacement, it is particularly instructive to review
briefly the history of New York City's prior commercial rent control
system.
In 1920, New York State and New York City promulgated the first
rent control legislation in the United States.67 In 1945, federal wartime
residential rent control existed in New York City.68 Unlike other ma-
jor American cities, New York City continued residential rent controls
when federal legislation expired in 1950. While New York City's com-
plex rent control system has undergone many changes since 1943, it
remains as controversial as ever.6 9
New York's commercial rent control legislation resulted from an in-
vestigation in 1944 by a special committee of the New York State Leg-
islature that responded to complaints about excessive rents and
evictions from New York City commercial tenants. The committee's
proposed remedial legislation was adopted quickly.7 ° Modelled on the
65. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8521-38 (Consol. 1945) (Expired Dec. 31, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as ECSRCL].
66. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8551-67 (Consol. 1945) (Expired Dec. 31, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as EBSRCL]. The Emergency Commercial Space and Emergency
Business Space Rent Control Laws were virtually identical. See generally Note, New
York Commercial and Business Rent Control Laws, 21 N.Y.U. L. REV. 427 (1946);
Note, New York Commercial Rent Control Acts, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 179 (1945).
67. 1920 N.Y. Laws chs. 130-39, 209-10. See Aron, The New York Landlord and
Tenant Laws of 1920, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5 (1920).
68. B. FRIEDLANDER & A. CURRIERI, supra note 64, § 8.
69. See, e.g., M. STEGMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK
CITY (1982).
70. See Meringolo, Rent Control: What Remains and Its Future, 22 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 207, 208-12 (1958).
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original 1920 New York residential rent control law and the World
War II federal legislation, the laws enacted in 1945 are very different
from Berkeley's Measure I.
a. Coverage
The New York Legislature enacted city-wide legislation did not at-
tempt to single out small business for protection. Exempted from con-
trol were the following: 1) specified businesses (for example, places of
public assembly, port-related uses, and temporary parking lots);
2) leases with less than four month terms; 3) condemned property;
4) new construction;7 1 and 5) vacated space.72 This last exemption, a
1950 amendment, was particularly important. Vacancy decontrol and
tenant turnover ensured the decontrol of many units as time passed.
The legislature also exempted leases with variable rents tied to sales
volume and graduated rents. Upon lease expiration, the legislation re-
quired landlords to set these rents either by arbitration or on the basis
of comparable rents.73 Leases in effect since June 1, 1939, also were
allowed to continue in effect. If the rent exceeded the allowable ceiling,
however, the legislation required landlords to reduce the rent to a com-
parable rent level.74
b. Base Rents
The base rents were those rents in effect on March 1, 1943, for com-
mercial space and June 1, 1944, for business space.75 The legislation
allowed landlords to add fifteen percent to this base rent to cover this
"rollback" period.7 6 The legislation allowed increases through three
different processes: 1) a written agreement between the landlord and
the tenant; 2) arbitration, with the consent of the tenant; or 3) by order
of the New York Supreme Court.7 7 Like New York's original 1920
71. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8535 and EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8564. New
construction was not exempted originally. This exemption was added by a 1946
amendment.
72. ECSRCL, szipra note 65, § 8533; EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8562.
73. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8534; EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8563.
74. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8522(e); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8552(c).
75. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8522(e); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8552(c).
76. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8522(e); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8552(c).
77. ECSRCL, supra note 65, §§ 8524(1), (3); EBSRCL, supra note 66, §§ 8554(1),
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rent control law, the legislature selected the courts, rather than an ad-
ministrative agency, as the enforcement mechanism.
The legislation established guidelines for determining a reasonable
rent based upon the tenants' proportional use of rentable commercial
space in a building. The legislation required arbitrators and judges to
consider maintenance and operating costs, including taxes but exclud-
ing amortization or interest on incumbrances. Also, the legislation re-
quired arbitrators and judges to consider the kind, quality, and
quantity of services furnished by the landlord.78 In effect, this allowed
landlords to pass through their operating and maintenance costs to
their tenants, and thereby maintain their net operating income (NOI)
as long as they maintained services.
c. Fair Return
Landlords who believed that their controlled rents denied them a
reasonable return could petition the New York Supreme Court for a
rent increase. The statutory fair return formula entitled landlords to a
net annual return of eight percent on the fair value of their property.7 9
The statute presumed that fair value was the latest assessed value, but
the landlord could offer other evidence on fair value.80 The statutory
scheme allowed landlords a six percent return on the value of the land
and buildings, and two percent for amortization of outstanding mort-
gages. The legislation limited fair return rent increases to no more
than fifteen percent annually.8
d. Eviction Control
Landlords could not evict protected commercial tenants except for
specified causes similar to those contained in Measure I.8z
e. Expiration
Originally, the legislature set the 1945 laws to expire in 1946. Begin-
ning with 1946 and continuing through 1963, the New York State Leg-
islature periodically renewed the laws. The legislature also amended
them, based upon the recommendations of the New York Temporary
78. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(1).
79. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(2); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(2).
80. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(1).
81. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(2); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(2).
82. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8528; EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8558.
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State Commission created in 1948 to study rents and rent conditions. 3
Landlords opposed these extensions through the political and legal
processes, but did not succeed until 1963, when the statutes finally
expired.
As this outline indicates, similarities exist between these World War
II era New York statutes and Measure I. On the other hand, the most
significant differences are: 1) coverage-New York was city-wide in
scope with some businesses and new construction exempted, while
Berkeley's coverage is limited geographically, but contains no exemp-
tions; 2) vacancy decontrol-New York allowed vacancy decontrol,
while Berkeley does not; 3) fair return-New York's fair return
formula was statutory, while Berkeley delegates its definition to an ad-
ministrative agency; 4) administration-while both are partially self-
enforcing by landlords and tenants, New York's system was legally en-
forceable only through the courts, while Berkeley selected the BBA as
its administrative agency for resolution of disputes; and 5) duration-
New York laws contained sunset clauses and the state determined ex-
tension, while Berkeley's experimental initiative contains no sunset
clause and must be amended or repealed by voter referendum.
2. Gradual Decontrol
Perhaps the most important difference between New York City's
system and Berkeley's experiment is that very shortly after its creation,
the New York Legislature amended its laws to provide for gradual de-
control of commercial rents.
The 1950 vacancy decontrol amendment did not ensure decontrol of
the regulated commercial rental market because commercial tenants
might refuse to vacate voluntarily. So-called "misfit" tenants refused
to vacate unless landlords paid them handsomely to leave. Other com-
mercial tenants vacated, but sublet the premises to subtenants that paid
them, rather than their landlords, rent in excess of regulated rent. The
legislature, under landlord pressure to encourage selective decontrol in
the absence of repeal of the laws and to prevent tenant "holdouts" and
windfalls, successively weakened the legislation to encourage
decontrol.
Beginning in 1949, the legislature permitted landlords to evict store
tenants that failed to meet the terms of "matching" leases offered to
prospective replacement tenants. Initially, landlords could evict ten-
83. See Meringolo, supra note 70, at 224.
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ants that were unable or unwilling to match a noncancellable lease at
an annual rental rate of $7,500 for a term of ten years or more. By
1960, the legislature reduced the threshold annual rent for a noncancel-
lable matching lease to $2,500.84
In 1952, the legislature weakened further store controls by allowing
landlords to evict tenants without making a matching offer when they
intended to assemble several spaces into a single unit renting for
$10,000 or more annually.85
In 1956, the legislature authorized landlords to evict tenants whose
leases had expired if they refused to accept a lease with a term of two
years or more. Initially, this applied to stores and non-store space rent-
ing for $20,000 or more annually and was reduced to only $2,500 by
1960.86
To prevent tenant windfalls attributable to subletting, a 1950 amend-
ment provided landlords with the option of requiring subtenants sub-
letting twenty percent or more of their space to pay to the landlord the
net rent that they received from the subtenant.87
In conclusion, the combination of vacancy decontrol, the matching
lease and space consolidation provisions, and the restrictions on sublet-
ting made the New York legislation significantly weaker than Berke-
ley's Measure I.
3. Judicial Interpretation
Exhaustive analysis of judicial interpretation of the New York stat-
utes is not a primary focus of this Article. Numerous reported deci-
sions have interpreted New York's commercial rent control scheme.
Because these decisions focus on particular statutory provisions, they
are not necessarily relevant to future judicial review of Measure I and
any additional contemporary counterparts. Nevertheless, they do pro-
vide guidance on many issues likely to arise in the future.
Analysis of the commercial rent control precedents established in
New York is limited to two subjects: constitutionality and fair return.
Both of these fundamental issues are likely to arise if Berkeley's Mea-
sure I is challenged legally. Therefore, a discussion of the leading deci-
sions of the New York Court of Appeals follows.
84. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8528(k); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8558(k).
85. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8528(kk); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8558(kk).
86. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8528(gg); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8558(gg).
87. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(4); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(4).
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a. Constitutionality
The New York Court of Appeals swiftly reviewed the constitutional-
ity of the Commercial Rent Control Act. Within six months of its
enactment, the court upheld the Act's constitutionality in Twentieth
Century Associates v. Waldman.8 The challengers claimed that the
Act impaired a pre-existing lease contract that the landlord sought to
enforce.
The court upheld the use of the state's police powers in an emer-
gency to regulate commercial rents. The court based its holding upon
the findings of the legislative committee, United States Supreme Court
precedents that upheld the 1920 residential rent control law against
similar challenges, 9 and the depression-era mortgage moratorium
laws.90 The court found the legislation reasonably related to its pur-
poses. It noted that the statutory scheme entitled landlords to judicial
review of regulated rents. It also concluded that the statute did not
violate constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.91
In Finn v. 415 Fifth Avenue Co.,92 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, upheld the constitutional-
ity of the same act when a landlord claimed that the Act constituted a
taking of private property without due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment. Judge Hand cited the New York Court of Appeals
decision and the precedents relied upon by that court. The United
88. 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 696 (1946). In
Court Square Bldg. v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 380, 83 N.E.2d 843 (1948), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 916 (1949), the court of appeals summarily upheld the validity of the
Emergency Business Space Rent Control Law relying upon the rationale of this
decision.
89. See Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). For an
analysis of these cases, see Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive
Due Process-The Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control, 7 URn. LAW.
447, 460-65 (1975).
90. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934).
91. See A.E.F.'s v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 381, 68 N.E.2d 177 (1946). The
New York Court of Appeals rejected a tenant claim that the statutory exemption of
piers, docks, and ferries violated its due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 385,
68 N.E.2d at 179. The commercial tenant operated a flower and fruit stand concession
in the terminal of the Staten Island Ferry, which was found to fall within this exception
to the EBSRCL. Id. at 384, 68 N.E.2d at 178.
92. 153 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1946). The landlord
unsuccessfully argued that a trustee in bankruptcy was not really a tenant.
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States Supreme Court declined to review either decision.93
In the wake of the renewal of the Business Space Act in 1955, a
landlord again challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the
ground that the emergency that justified rent regulation had ended.
Landlords had opposed unsuccessfully the extension of the Act in pub-
lic hearings conducted by the New York Temporary State Commis-
sion. In Charleston Corp. v. Sinclair,9 4 the United States Supreme
Court had ruled that the courts reserved the right to determine if a
rational basis existed for the legislative declaration of an emergency
sufficient to invoke the police power for the public purpose of rent
regulation.
The landlord presented the same evidence and witnesses that com-
mercial landlords had presented earlier to the New York Temporary
State Commission. The landlord attempted to prove that the emer-
gency had ended because of the construction of substantial new office
space and an adequate vacancy rate.95 The court of appeals, relying
upon the contention of the New York Attorney General who disputed
the validity of the landlords' factual claims, concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to overcome its heavy burden of proof-at least in 1955.
The court added that whether and for how long the legislature lawfully
could continue office rent control was a question open for future
review.1
6
That review came in 1960 in an action brought by the same landlord,
following the legislature's 1959 extension of the commercial rent con-
trol law. Again, the landlord offered similar evidence, which the New
York Temporary State Commission and the New York Attorney Gen-
eral had rejected. The court of appeals again concluded that the land-
lord failed to carry his heavy burden of proof.97
93. Finn, 153 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946); Twentieth Cen-
tury Assocs., 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 696
(1946).
94. 264 U.S. 543 (1922).
95. See Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Barr, 1 Misc. 2d 560, 566, 149 N.Y.S.2d 460, 467
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), affid, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 135 N.E.2d 801, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, appeal
dismissed, 355 U.S. 12 (1957).
96. 1 N.Y.2d 413, 420, 135 N.E.2d 801, 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (1956), appeal
dismissed, 355 U.S. 12 (1957). The following year the court of appeals rejected a similar
challenge to the constitutionality of the continuation of hotel rent control. Hotel Ass'n
of New York City v. Weaver, 3 N.Y.2d 206, 217, 144 N.E.2d 14, 20, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 17,
26 (1957).
97. Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Jame, 8 N.Y.2d 179, 168 N.E.2d 528, 203 N.Y.S.2d 86
(1960). "The evidence presented by the landlord, as developed at trial, served only to
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Additionally, the court pointed to the legislature's weakening of the
law through a 1956 decontrol amendment as an indication of the im-
plementation of a program of gradual relaxation of controls: "It is our
opinion that such a process of gradual, rather than abrupt, cessation of
controls, commensurate with the moderation in market conditions, ef-
fectuates a transition from controls to normal landlord-tenant relations
in a rational and orderly manner, without economic disruption and dis-
location.""8 Given its two preceding opinions on the subject and the
weakening of commercial rent control through additional decontrol
amendments, this conclusion is hardly surprising.
b. Fair Return
The New York Court of Appeals consistently upheld the constitu-
tionality of the fair return formula of the commercial rent control laws
and its application. The court upheld the validity of the statutory pre-
sumption that it guaranteed landlords a reasonable return without ana-
lyzing the eight percent return on current assessed value formula.
Instead, the court's review generally concerned the application of the
formula.
In Relmar Operating Corp. v. Roffer,99 the court held that a commer-
cial landlord was entitled only to a fair return from the entire building,
but not to a pro rata share from each individual commercial tenant
occupying space in the building. In Hecht Broadway Corp. v.
Ashenfarb,l° the court rejected the argument that the fair return
formula unconstitutionally discriminated in favor of landlords with
mortgages who were entitled to an eight percent return, while owners
of nonmortgaged properties were entitled only to a six percent rate of
demonstrate that the intensity of the emergency which prevailed in 1955 [the period
reviewed in the Barr case] has moderated to some extent, but not in substantial degree."
Id. at 181, 168 N.E.2d at 529, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 88. See Note, Rent Control-Review of
Emergency Commercial and Business Space Rent Control Laws-Gradual Cessation of
Controls, 7 N.Y.L.F. 81 (1961).
98. 8 N.Y.2d at 182, 168 N.E.2d at 529-30, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 88-89. The court cited
the right of the landlord to decontrol the unit after the expiration of a two year lease or
immediately if the tenant refused to accept and the reduction of the applicable annual
rent threshold from $20,000 to only $2,500 by 1960 after the commencement of this
litigation. Id.
99. 297 N.Y. 609, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947). The courts, however, were authorized to
adjust the rents of any individual tenants in setting an overall fair return for the entire
building. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(2); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(2).
100. 298 N.Y. 769, 83 N.E.2d 464 (1948).
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return. Finally, in Steinberg v. Forest Hills Golf Range, Inc.,t 1 the
court ruled that landlords were not entitled automatically to the statu-
tory rate of return because the law only created a "presumption" that
this was a fair return. In this case, the owner received a return of only
three and one-half percent on unimproved property. The landlord's
mortgage interest was double the rent. The fair return formula did not
take debt service into account. If, on the other hand, the landlord al-
ready was receiving a return in excess of the statutory formula, the
New York Supreme Court could deny a rent increase. 10
2
The court of appeals, New York's lowest appellate courts, and the
trial courts addressed numerous procedural issues concerning the ap-
plication of the return on assessed value formula. Under this formula,
a landlord was entitled to petition for a rent increase, subject to the
fifteen percent annual adjustment ceiling,'03 if the base rent plus allow-
able operating and maintenance cost pass through increases failed to
provide the statutory fair return."° The statutory scheme required
landlords to file a "bill of particulars" to establish their income and
operating and maintenance expenses.'0 5 These figures then were sub-
101. 303 N.Y. 577, 105 N.E.2d 93 (1952). The same conclusion was reached in
other circumstances. See, eg., In re Rego Park Houses, 201 Misc. 126, 113 N.Y.S.2d
174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (where the property was condemned).
102. See In re Cara Realty Corp., 282 A.D. 700, 700, 122 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (1953).
103. The court of appeals upheld this ceiling. See A.E.F.'s, 295 N.Y. 381, 68
N.E.2d 177 (1946). See also In re Court & Remson Bldg. Corp., 303 N.Y. 358, 102
N.E.2d 696 (1951).
104. In re Rutherford Estates, 95 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affid, 301 N.Y.
767, 95 N.E.2d 821 (1950) (the tenants unsuccessfully argued that the landlord must
pay these and any other expenses from net income based upon a fair and reasonable
rental value); In re 551 Fifth Ave., 197 Misc. 217, 97 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949)
(the cost of operation and maintenance are included impliedly in the formula applied in
fixing rents).
105. This bill was required to set forth the gross income derived from the entire
building or other rental area during the preceding year, the names and addresses of
all tenants, the rental charged each tenant and how payable, the consideration paid
by the landlord for the entire property including the land, if he be the owner
thereof, or if he be a lessee the name and address of the lessor and the rent agreed
to be paid; the assessed valuation of the property as shown by the latest completed
assessment-roll of the city, separately showing the amount of the assessment on the
building and the amount of the assessment on the land; the cost of maintenance
and operation of the building or other rental area during the preceding year, the
kind, quality and quantity of services furnished during such year; and such other
facts as the landlord claims affect the net income of the entire building or other
rental area, or the reasonableness of the rent to be charged.
ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(1). In In re Trust-
ees of the Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund, 1 N.Y.2d 616, 623, 136 N.E.2d 889, 896,
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ject to tenant challenges and judicial review.10 6
In numerous cases the courts readjusted income and expense data in
determining what constituted "net annual return." In Court Square
Building, Inc. v. City of New York,1"7 the court of appeals ruled that
gross income must be computed on the basis of actual income. In In re
Trustees of the Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund, °8 the court of appeals
revised a landlord's income by including imputed income from tax sav-
ings from its charitable status.
If maintenance costs actually constituted capital improvements, the
courts reserved the right to consider their probable life and prorate
these costs, because the statutes made no specific provision for capital
improvements.1°9 Courts also could add the value of capital improve-
ments to the assessed value in determining value. 1
The statutes made no specific provision for depreciation. Landlords
claimed this constituted an operating expense. In In re Fifth Madison
Corp.," the court of appeals held that the statutory fair return
formula for operating and maintenance costs was limited to actual
costs. Because depreciation constituted a theoretical cost, landlords
were not entitled to any reimbursement for it unless they proved actual
physical deterioration of the building.
In several cases, the courts took the actual physical condition of the
154 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943-44 (1956), the court of appeals ruled that the trial court may
consider changes in landlords' income and expenses between the filing of the petition
and the trial. See also In re Alibel Corporation, 285 A.D. 140, 136 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1954)
(post-petition changes in income are proper facts for consideration in computing reason-
able rent income).
106. See In re Frankel, 269 A.D. 531, 533, 56 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1945) (case re-
manded because the trial judge failed to indicate what allowances he made for the land-
lord's operating and maintenance expenses).
107. 298 N.Y. 380, 83 N.E.2d at 843 (1949). The court disallowed inclusion of a
15% rent adjustment to which the landlord might be entitled in gross rent. As a result,
the City of New York's proportional rent-for occupancy by the municipal court-was
increased to provide the landlord with the statutory fair return. Income from residen-
tial tenants in mixed-use buildings was deducted from gross income. See, e.g., In re
Birrell, 13 Misc. 2d 165, 169-70, 175 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453-54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
108. 1 N.Y.2d 616, 623-24, 136 N.E.2d 889, 897, 154 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944-45 (1956),
109. See Schack v. Handel, 277 A.D. 1, 62 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1946) (must consider
probable life of improvements in determining reasonable rents).
110. See, e.g., In re Trustees of the Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund, 1 N.Y.2d 616,
624-25, 136 N.E.2d 889, 897, 154 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945-46 (1956) (cost of utility conver-
sion improvements added to assessed value).
111. 297 N.Y. 155, 77 N.E.2d 134 (1948) (without the inclusion of depreciation, the
landlord only received a 5.23%, instead of the statutory 6%, return).
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building into account. The statutes allowed the courts to consider the
kind, quality, and quantity of services furnished.11 2 When the building
substantially violated code standards, the courts reduced the rate of
return below the statutory standard.' In determining a fair and rea-
sonable rent, the courts noted that landlords could not cast additional
burdens or expenses chargeable to the maintenance of the building
upon the tenants of the business space for any inadequacy of the
rent. 1 14
Landlords often disputed whether the assessed value represented the
fair market value. The courts held that this was a rebuttable presump-
tion. Landlords often introduced evidence in the form of real estate
appraisers' opinions in their attempts to overcome this presumption
and challenge assessed value. Generally, the most recent assessed
value provided the basis for determining fair return." 5 The fact that
the landlord had applied for a tax assessment reduction was not consid-
ered conclusive as to the actual value." 6 In In re Trustees of the Ma-
sonic Hall and Asylum Fund,"7 the court of appeals held that a tax
exempt landlord's tax savings constituted imputed income and could
not be added to assessed value. The courts allowed consideration of
the improvements when value was in dispute." 8 As previously indi-
cated, consideration was given, where appropriate, to the physical con-
dition of the building. The courts, as required by the statutes," 9
112. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(1).
113. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 278 A.D. 814, 104 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1951) (the building
was 60 years old, unheated, rundown, and rat-infested); In re Broaduane Corp., 137
N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952) (a very old and neglected building).
114. See, eg., In re Sewdon Realty Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948).
115. The use of a prior figure was disfavored. See, e.g., In re 104 Bleeker St., 284
A.D. 257, 131 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1954).
116. See, e.g., In re Broaduane Corp., 384 A.D. 1034, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 112 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952); In re No. 1 West 39th St. Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 149, 178 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1958).
117. 1 N.Y.2d 616, 623-24, 136 N.E.2d 889, 895, 154 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945 (1956).
118. See, e.g., Cedar-Temple Realty Corp. v. Astor, 276 A.D. 2d 139, 93 N.Y.S.2d
259 (1949) ("fair and reasonable proportion of the gross rentals. . . [must] be deter-
mined upon the basis of the relative rental values of floor space"); Schack v. Handel,
271 A.D. 1, 62 N Y.S.2d 407 (1946) ("probable life of improvements having some de-
gree of permanency should be considered in fixing the amount to be charged as
expenses").
119. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8554(1).
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apportioned allowable rent increases based upon the tenants' pro rata
occupancy of commercial space and the fair rents per square foot.
New York's history of commercial rent control offers several lessons.
First, the courts consistently sustained the statutes against constitu-
tional attacks based on alleged violations of landlords' contracts, due
process, and equal protection rights.
Second, the courts rejected repeated landlord claims that the emer-
gency justifying commercial rent control had concluded. The courts
presumed that the New York Legislature, based upon periodic reviews
by the Temporary State Commission, was justified in extending con-
trols. Significantly, the New York Court of Appeals took this stance
while pointing to the state's policy of gradual decontrol. Whether the
courts would have treated a more stringent regulatory system differ-
ently is unknown.
Third, because of the system's structure, and the litigious nature of
commercial landlords and tenants, the courts reviewed the application
of the statutes on numerous occasions. This body of case law provides
considerable insight into the issues that arose under the New York
System.
Finally, the courts upheld the validity of New York's fair return
formula and reviewed the major issues arising from its application.
Unfortunately, no systematic evaluation of New York City's commer-
cial rent control program was ever conducted. Therefore, its impact
remains undocumented.
B. Berkeley: 1978-1979
1. Statutory Structure
Aside from New York City, Berkeley itself serves as the only other
precedent for commercial rent control. On November 7, 1978, Berke-
ley voters approved an initiative ordinance entitled "Renter Property
Tax Relief." This initiative was designed to provide a partial rebate to
residential and commercial tenants of landlords' windfall gains from
the property tax reductions that resulted from the June 1978 passage of
Proposition 13.1.2
The initiative required all landlords to reduce their 1979 rents by an
amount equal to eighty percent of their Proposition 13 property tax
savings. To prevent landlords with short-term leases from recapturing
this rebate through rent increases, the initiative provided for control of
120. See supra note 26.
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rent increases. The initiative permitted landlords to increase rents for
operating expenses, maintenance cost increases, and capital improve-
ments. The initiative failed to provide for an administrative enforce-
ment mechanism. At its expiration date of December 31, 1979, the
commercial rent regulation was not renewed. Residential rent con-
trols, however, were extended, first by the Berkeley City Council and
later by the Berkeley voters.
Several significant differences exist between the temporary initiative
and Measure I. First and foremost, this regulation was not so much of
a commercial rent control scheme as it was a limited form of property
tax relief; its purpose was not to prevent the displacement of
merchants. It was city-wide in scope and, furthermore, the regulation
was self-enforcing. Finally, the regulation contained a sunset clause.
In view of these significant differences, little similarity exists between
the two Berkeley initiatives.
2. Judicial Interpretation
In Rue-Ell Enterprises v. City of Berkeley,121 the only case involving
a challenge to the ordinance's validity, the California Court of Appeal
posthumously upheld the ordinance's constitutionality. A commercial
landlord challenged the application of the initiative to two of his ten
commercial properties. The leases involved provided for cost-of-living
rent adjustments. The ordinance reduced the combined monthly rents
of $2,158 of the commercial tenants by $199.
The landlord asserted that the ordinance violated the contract
clauses of the United States and California Constitutions and that the
California property tax law preempted the ordinance. The landlord's
contract clause argument assumed that the ordinance substantially im-
paired his pre-existing leases and that an emergency, which did not
exist, was required to justify the contract impairment. The court re-
jected the argument because the law only partially recaptured windfall
gains and only then for the one year that it was in effect. 122 After it
reached that conclusion, the court found it unnecessary to pursue the
additional analytical steps applied recently by the United States
Supreme Court in contract impairment cases.123
121. 147 Cal. App. 3d 81, 194 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983).
122. Id. at 85-86, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
123. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983). In Energy Reserves Group,
the Supreme Court set out a three step inquiry for review under the contract clause:
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Furthermore, the court noted that an "emergency" was no longer
required to justify contract regulations. Instead, the United States
Supreme Court has held that these regulations "must have a significant
and legitimate public purpose. . . such as remedying. . . a broad and
general social or economic problem." '124 This is in accord with
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,125 in which the California Supreme
Court held that an emergency was no longer needed for the regulation
of residential rents. The court did not review the trial judge's consider-
ation of evidence introduced by the City of Berkeley to prove that a
shortage of commercial rental space existed.26
Finally, the court rejected the claim that California law preempted
this type of regulation, citing the California Supreme Court's prior de-
cision regarding state preemption of residential rent control.' 27
Rue-Ell, however, provides little guidance as to how the courts will
view Measure I, both on its face and as applied by the BBA since June
1982.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMERCIAL RENT
STABILIZATION IN BERKELEY: 1982-1984
A. Administration
Berkeley provided for the implementation of Measure I by ap-
pointing a member of the City's Planning and Community Develop-
ment staff as the program coordinator. The Mayor and City
Attorney's staff provided additional administrative support to the
BBA.
B. Administrative Regulations
The BBA issued its initial regulations implementing Measure I in
1) whether the state enactment operates substantially to impair a contractual relation.
ship; 2) if so, whether the state has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind
the regulation; and 3) if so, whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of
the contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appro-
priate to the public purpose justifying the law's adoption. 459 U.S. 410-12. See gener-
ally Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1414 (1984).
124. Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411-12.
125. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 146-50, 550 P.2d 1001, 1018-23, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 481-86
(1976).
126. Rue-Ell, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
127. Id. (citing Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 163, 550 P.2d 1001,
1026, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 490 (1976)).
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October 1982. These regulations require Elmwood's commercial land-
lords to notify tenants of prevailing rents, any rent increases, petitions
to the BBA for extraordinary rent increases, and their right to chal-
lenge these by petition to the BBA. The regulations also establish a
process for the filing and reviewing of these petitions and set forth an
amortization schedule for capital improvements. Since the issuance of
these regulations, the BBA has authorized Elmwood's commercial
landlords to raise rents for their increased operating and maintenance
expenses, and amortized capital improvements, without having to no-
tify or seek the consent of the BBA.
C. Fair Return
Measure I guarantees landlords a "fair and reasonable return on in-
vestment." 128 None of these terms is defined. If landlords believe that
their rents under Measure I, including any base rent adjustments, in-
creases for increased operating and maintenance expenses, and amor-
tized capital improvements, fail to provide them with a fair return,
Measure I allows them to petition the BBA for "extraordinary" rent
increases.129  Measure I requires the BBA to issue fair return
regulations. '3
0
Exactly what constitutes a fair return under rent control has been a
leading issue since the inception of American-style rent control. The
courts often have attempted to define a fair return under residential
rent controls. To date, the legal standards applicable to fair return re-
main inconsistent and confused. Since the advent of contemporary
state and local rent controls outside New York in 1969, the California,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey appellate courts have attempted re-
peatedly to solve this puzzle. These state residential rent control cases
have precedential value for determining the validity of the BBA's fair
return formula for Elmwood's commercial landlords and tenants.
Several factors influenced the BBA when it initiated the Measure I
program. First, in Birkenfeld, the California Supreme Court failed to
define what it meant when it enunciated a fair return standard for resi-
dential rent control which required that landlords be guaranteed "a
just and reasonable return on their property."' 131 In California, no de-
128. MEASURE I, supra note 45, §§ 6(a), (c).
129. Id. § 6(b).
130. Id. § 6(c).
131. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 165, 550 P.2d at 1026-27, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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finitive legal guidelines existed to guide the BBA.
Second, five competing fair return standards, which are listed in Ta-
ble 2, existed from which the BBA could choose. All of these have
been applied to residential landlords and are applicable to commercial
landlords.' 32
Table 2
Fair Return Standards
1. Cash Flow
gross rent = operating expenses + mortgage payments
la. return on gross rent (a variant of the cash flow
standard)
gross rent = x (operating expenses + mortgage
payments)
2. Return on Equity
gross 'rent = operating expenses + mortgage payments
+ x (cash investment)
3. Return on Value
gross rent = operating expenses + x (value)
4. Percentage Net Operating Income
gross rent = x (operating expenses)
5. Maintenance of Net Operating Income
gross rent = base date gross rent + (current operating
expenses - base date operating expenses)
Under the cash flow standard, a landlord is entitled to rents that are
sufficient to cover operating expenses and mortgage payments. The im-
pact of this formula varies according to landlords' financing arrange-
ments. Recent purchasers whose higher interest mortgages have
resulted in negative cash flow may be entitled to large rent increases
under this standard.
The fair return on gross rent formula utilizes the same variables as
the cash flow standard, but differs because it guarantees that the rent
132. For an excellent discussion of these fair return standards, see Baar, Guidelines
for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 781-
817 (1983).
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will yield a cash flow equal to a specified percentage-for example, six
to eight percent--of the sum of operating expenses and mortgage
payments.
The fair return on equity formula usually defines equity as the land-
lord's original cash investment. This often is adjusted when refinanc-
ing and capital improvements have occurred and also may be adjusted
for inflation. A percentage return is chosen, and often is tied to pre-
vailing mortgage interest rates. The rents required to provide a fair
return vary considerably depending on the timing and nature of a land-
lord's investment and financing arrangements.
The return on value standard does not take into account a landlord's
investment and financing. A percentage return is based upon the value
of the property. Value may be defined as assessed value. The New
York commercial rent laws, which set current assessed value as the fair
value, took this approach. 33 The shortcomings of the property tax
assessment system pose serious problems in applying this standard.'34
Alternative standards for determining value include: 1) purchase
price; 2) historic value-that is, the market value prior to the adoption
of rent control; 3) comparable value in a balanced or equilibrium mar-
ket; and 4) replacement costs. Each of these standards, however, poses
serious problems. Purchase prices may not be a valid indicator of cur-
rent value, may discriminate against long-term owners while rewarding
recent purchasers, and are subject to manipulation by purchasers. His-
toric value may incorporate an inflated pre-rent control market and
institutionalize artificially high values reflecting spiralling rents. Val-
ues in an equilibrium market require a determination of hypothetical
values based upon comparable rents. This exercise is virtually impossi-
ble, making this standard unworkable in practice because the standard
would require the calculation of the value of all regulated properties.
Finally, replacement cost is not a valid indicator of current value. Re-
placement value based upon construction costs usually exceeds current
value.
In addition to these problems, the most important conceptual prob-
lem with the return on value standard is its circularity. Because the
value of regulated property is determined by its projected income
stream, and rent controls determine rents, value is determined in a cir-
133. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
134. Baar, supra note 132, at 799-800.
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cular fashion. If unregulated rents, as opposed to regulated rents, are
used to determine value, then the purpose of regulation is thwarted.
Under the percentage net operating income standard, a rent increase
is warranted if the net operating income is less than a designated per-
centage of its gross rental income. The purpose of this standard is to
provide landlords with a guaranteed minimum net operating income to
gross rent ratio that provides adequate income for debt service and
profit.
There are major advantages to the percentage net operating income
standard. It avoids the circularity associated with return on value
standards. In addition, the owner's particular purchase price, invest-
ment, or financing arrangements are not variables in the calculation.
The primary disadvantage of the standard is that it establishes a fair
uniform net operating income to gross rental income ratio, when, in
fact, landlords' net operating income to gross rent ratios vary widely.
Under the maintenance of net operating income standard, landlords
are entitled to rent increases sufficient to cover increased operating and
maintenance expenses, exclusive of debt service. Landlords' net oper-
ating income (NOI) may be fully or partially adjusted for inflation.
This formula avoids the problems associated with the other fair return
standards and guarantees the maintenance of the landlords' pre-rent
control NOI. The formula has been criticized for failing to guarantee
landlords a positive cash flow and for its acceptance of landlords' dif-
fering individual NOI.
Rather than analyze the arguments for and against these fair return
formulas, their adoption under residential rent controls, and their judi-
cial treatment, the reader is referred to an exhaustive treatment of this
subject. 135 The arguments for and against alternate fair return formu-
las made by Elmwood landlords and tenants, and the legal issues raised
by the fair return formula adopted by the BBA, are considered below.
A third factor that influenced the BBA's formula decision was
Berkeley's residential Rent Stabilization Board's (BRSB) adoption of a
maintenance of net operating income (MNOI) fair return standard for
residential housing. Landlords could apply for adjustments if their ad-
justed base rent did not maintain their individual NOI on a dollar-for-
dollar basis' 36 as of May 1980-the base rent date. Landlords are enti-
tled to annual general adjustments based upon city-wide increases in
135. Id. at 781-817.
136. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization Board Regulations, §§ 1262-66 (1981).
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operating and maintenance costs.13 7 Like Measure I, Berkeley's 1980
residential rent control initiative delegated the formulation of a fair re-
turn formula to an appointed board, which adopted the formula on the
basis of legislative criteria. 131 In the debate over the adoption of this
standard, landlord representatives on the BRSB unsuccessfully argued
that the BRSB should not only maintain residential landlords' NOI at
its pre-1980 level, but also should partially or fully adjust the NOI for
inflation. Commercial landlords hold the same views.
Fourth, the BBA had no useful commercial rent control precedents.
The New York formula was not applicable because the BBA could not
presume that assessed value represented a fair value. Proposition 13,
which went into effect in 1978, had artificially reduced assessed values
to their 1975 levels. With few exceptions-for example, a current full
market value assessment immediately following a bona fide transfer-
the assessment of most California commercial property did not reflect
current market value. Berkeley's short-lived predecessor initiative reg-
ulating commercial rents had no fair return formula.
Finally, Measure I already guaranteed that Elmwood's commercial
landlords would maintain their NOI because Measure I entitled them
to pass through immediately all increases in operating and mainte-
nance expenses. Because Measure I entitled landlords to "extraordi-
nary" additional rent adjustments if necessary to provide a fair and
reasonable return on investment, the measure seemed to preclude the
BBA from adopting the simple dollar-for-dollar MNOI standard that
the BRSB had adopted for residential rent control. 139
To address these questions, the BBA appointed a Fair Return Sub-
committee and hired the same consultants that had assisted the BRSB
in the formulation of its fair return standards. 1" The BBA and its Fair
Return Subcommittee deliberated for approximately one year before
137. BERKELEY, CAL., RENT STABILIZATION AND EVICTION FOR GOOD CAUSE
ORDINANCE § Il(b) (1980). The California Supreme Court recently upheld the consti-
tutionality of this provision in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, - Cal. 3d -, 693 P.2d 261,
209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984). See infra text accompanying note 228 and the Epilogue at
pp. 182-84.
138. The ordinance provides for individual rent adjustments when "necessary to
provide the landlord with a fair return on investment." BERKELEY CAL., RENT STABI-
LIZATION AND EVICTION FOR GOOD CAUSE ORDINANCE § 12(c) (1980). The board
must consider all relevant factors, including ten listed factors. See infra note 230.
139. MEASURE I, supra note 45, §§ 5(c)(i), 6.
140. The author also has been a consultant to the Berkeley Rent Stabilization
Board.
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they adopted a fair return formula in October 1983, after several public
hearings and extensive consultation with representatives of Elmwood's
landlords and tenants. This lengthy deliberation process is detailed be-
low as an illustration of the complexity of this critical issue.
Initially, the Subcommittee considered the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the alternate formulas described earlier, with the ex-
ception of the return on assessed market value formula. The Subcom-
mittee considered and rejected the alternative of proceeding on a case-
by-case basis without a set formula. Measure I implicitly called for a
formula, and even with the small number of units involved, it was ad-
ministratively desirable to minimize the burden on the BBA in dispute
resolutions occasioned by landlord petitions for rent increases. There-
fore, the Subcommittee sought a single, set fair return formula under-
standable, if not entirely acceptable, to all Elmwood landlords and
tenants.
While the Subcommittee considered alternative standards, the con-
sultants conducted a survey of Elmwood's landlords and tenants to ob-
tain information on lease provisions, rents, and landlord ownership and
financing. Only a few landlords responded, and then only partially, to
the survey, leaving the Subcommittee without information concerning
landlord ownership and financing. In contrast, approximately sixty
percent of the tenants provided information concerning rents, rent in-
creases, and leases. 141 The survey revealed a variety of types and terms
of leases. Approximately one-third of the responding tenants had
leases with escalator clauses tied to inflation and approximately half
had long-term leases of four or more years. As Table 3 indicates, with
the exception of property taxes, most commercial tenants were respon-
sible for payment of the operating and maintenance expenses for their
property.
141. See K. BAAR & W.D. KEATING, supra note 24, at 1.
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Table 3
Landlord-Tenant Responsibility for Expenses142
Expenses Paid by Owner Paid by Tenant Shared
Electricity 2 40 0
Gas 2 38 0
Water 9 32 0
Sewer Treatment and
Maintenance 9 26 0
Trash 5 37 0
Insurance (Fire and Liability) 15 37 0
Operating, Maintenance, and
Repairs 12 21 5
Property Taxes 18 16 1
This pattern is not unusual for commercial leases. Many commercial
tenants bear some, most, or all of the costs of maintaining and operat-
ing their business premises. 143
Moreover, it has become increasingly common for landlords to in-
clude inflation escalator clauses in commercial leases." 4 Two issues
commonly arise in commercial lease negotiations over escalator
clauses: first, which inflation index the parties will use and, second,
whether the landlord will pass all or only part of the inflation, accord-
ing to the index selected, on to the tenant.
Several price indices, both national and regional, can serve as the
basis for inflation escalation clauses. The most commonly used indices
are the all urban consumers price index (CPI-U), the urban wage earn-
ers index, and the producers price index.145 Landlords and tenants use
these indices in lieu of more precise localized indices applicable to the
activities of commercial landlords.
Landlords seek the inclusion of escalator clauses to protect the re-
duction of their return under long-term leases when inflation can ex-
142. Id. table 2, at 3.
143. See generally Rahm, Escalation Clauses in Urban Office Leases, 12 REAL ES-
TATE REV., Summer 1982, at 55 (discusses urban office lease escalator clauses com-
monly used in New York City).
144. Id. See also Lewis & Nosari, Consumer Price Index Escalation Clauses in
Leases, 10 REAL ESTATE REV., Fall 1980, at 101, 102; Note, Lease Escalation Clauses
Using the Consumer Price Index-How Well Do They Work?, 7 OKLA. CITY L. REv.
489, 489 (1982).
145. For an explanation of the CPI-U, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, REPT. 517, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: CONCEPTS AND CON-
TENT OVER THE YEARS (rev. ed. May 1978).
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ceed rent increases, including the pass through of the landlords'
operating and maintenance expenses to tenants. In contrast, tenants
with sufficient bargaining power prefer that the landlord bear the risk
of absorbing all, or at least part, of the impact of inflation over the lease
term. This is true especially when tenants' rents are adjusted upward
based upon increased sales and income in so-called "kicker" clauses or
net percentage leases.
When tenants must accept inflation escalator clauses, landlords most
commonly choose either the national or the regional version of the
CPI-U that is issued bi-monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the United States Department of Labor. Generally, the courts have
upheld the validity of these commercial lease escalator clauses against
challenges based upon tenant theories of unconscionability and unjust
enrichment, if the applicable index is identified correctly and the
method for the calculation of rent increases based on the index selected
is workable and understandable.1 46
Measure I uses the CPI-U index for the San Francisco-Oakland re-
gion as a standard of reasonableness for rent increases preceding its
enactment.147 The inclusion or exclusion of full or partial inflation ad-
justments in a fair return formula is a recurrent issue, which the BBA
Subcommittee addressed. The BRSB residential rent stabilization reg-
ulations did not provide for inflation adjustment. Unlike many of Elm-
wood's commercial tenants, however, most residential tenants,
including those in Berkeley, have short term (often month-to-month)
leases that do not include escalator clauses. In considering the use of
the CPI-U, the Subcommittee was informed of an important pending
change in its calculation.
In January 1981, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics announced
that beginning in January 1985, the Bureau of Labor Statistics would
revise the CPI-U."4 ' The "housing" component, comprising approxi-
mately twenty-three percent of its weight, would no longer be based
primarily upon changes in the prices of home purchases and mortgage
interest rates. Instead, the Bureau developed a "rental equivalency"
index to measure homeownership cost changes that reduce the impact
of these two factors. This substitution has been much debated, was
long considered by the Bureau, and was advocated by critics of the
146. See Note, supra note 144, at 493-504.
147. MEASURE I, supra note 45, §§ 4(0, 13(b).
148. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/3
COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL
CPI-U.149 Critics have argued that the increases in the costs of home
purchases and mortgage interest rates have over-weighed the CPI-U.
This change will affect the CPI-U and its future impact on Elmwood's
tenants under the BBA's fair return formula.
In February 1983, the Subcommittee's consultants recommended
that the BBA adopt a novel version of the NOI fair return formula
designed to fulfill Measure I's purpose, comply with its language, and
deal with the peculiar characteristics of Elmwood's regulated proper-
ties. The consultants recommended that the BBA require all landlords
to register their mean 1981 base NOI-1981 base rent minus operating
and maintenance expenses exclusive of debt service-on a per square
foot basis. After the registration period and BBA resolution of any
landlord-tenant disputes over registered rents, landlord expenses, NOI,
or occupied rental space contained in the registration statements, the
BRA would calculate the 1981 mean NOI per square foot for the entire
Elmwood district.
The proposal would entitle landlords in compliance with the law,
upon annual application to the BBA, to an automatic rent adjustment.
The BBA would calculate this adjustment by applying the prior year's
full increase, if any, in the San Franciso-Oakland CPI-U to the base
1981 mean NOI for the district. The BBA then would apply this pro
rata to individual businesses based on the square footage.
The consultants' survey determined that the 1981 mean rent per
square foot in Elmwood was fifty-eight cents. 150 Assuming that land-
lords' operating and maintenance expenses averaged twenty percent of
gross rent, the mean NOI per square foot would be forty-six cents. If
the San Franciso-Oakland CPI-U increased by ten percent during the
year prior to the allowable adjustment, then all Elmwood landlords
would be entitled to raise their rents by 4.6 cents per square foot. If a
tenant's rent was forty cents per square foot, then the BBA would al-
low a rent increase of 4.6 cents-possibly rounded to five cents. If the
tenant's space consisted of one thousand square feet, the landlord
would increase the monthly rent from $400 to $446-or $450 if
rounded.
149. See Cagan & Moore, Some Proposals to Improve the Consumer Price Index, 104
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1981, at 20; Gillingham & Lane, Changing the Treatment
of Shelter Costs for Home-Owners in the CPI, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1982, at
9; Mitchell & Triplett, Does the CPI Exaggerate or Understand Inflation?, 103
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1980, at 31; Norwood, Two Consumer Price Index Issues:
Weighing and Homeownership, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 58.
150. K. BAAR & W.D. KEATING, supra note 24, table 3, at 3.
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The consultants' rationale for this recommendation was that this
either would reduce or at least not widen the gap between those busi-
nesses with the highest and lowest rents. Instead of adjusting the indi-
vidual landlord's base NOI by a fixed percentage, all landlords would
receive the same uniform inflation adjustment per square foot. The
consultants designed the automatic nature of the adjustment to elimi-
nate the problems associated with discretionary adjustments. The con-
sultants did not believe that a full inflation adjustment of the mean
NOI was unfair in view of the survey finding that, prior to the passage
of Measure I, one-third of the tenants already had leases providing for
rent escalators tied to inflation. The consultants believed that no ceil-
ing on the inflation adjustment was required, at least initially.
The consultants further recommended the provision for an addi-
tional adjustment of the base rent when the rent was extremely low.
The consultants' survey revealed that 1981 rents ranged as low as fif-
teen cents per square foot, compared to a high of one dollar thirty-two
cents per square foot. Half of the rents reported were below the district
mean of forty-eight cents per square foot.1"' If the 1981 base rent for a
unit was below the district mean rent, the consultants recommended an
adjustment upward incrementally until the rent reached that mean,
subject to a twenty percent annual ceiling on increases to prevent ten-
ant hardship.
In the previous example, the hypothetical rent of forty cents per
square foot was almost one-third below the 1981 district mean rent of
fifty-eight cents per square foot. Therefore, an additional annual ad-
justment of eight cents (forty cents per square foot multiplied by
twenty percent) per square foot would be allowed until this difference
was eliminated. This would result in the following incremental
monthly rental increases over a three year period:
Year 1 - $80 (1,000 square feet X $0.08 per square foot)
Year 2 - $80 (1,000 square feet X $0.08 per square foot)
Year 3 - $20 (1,000 square feet X $0.02 per square foot)
Total Increase - $180 (1,000 square feet X $0.18 per square foot)
The Subcommittee also favored a "banking" provision allowing
landlords to bank all or some of the fair return adjustments to which
they were entitled if they chose to delay raising rents. Landlords ex-
empt from coverage until the expiration of their pre-existing leases also
151. Id.
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could bank any differences between the rent increases under their leases
and the annual fair return adjustments and then charge the tenant the
cumulative differential when Measure I took effect.
The BBA would entitle no landlord to any fair return adjustment
until at least half of the landlords registered. Landlords would lose
their right to any fair return increases during the period when they
were not properly registered.
Finally, the consultants recommended against conditioning rent ad-
justments on full or substantial code compliance until the BBA and the
city conducted a survey of the condition of Elmwood's buildings to
determine their physical condition. Residential rent control statutes
often condition rent increases on substantial code compliance,
although Measure I contains no such requirement. In Orange Taxpay-
ers Council, Inc. v. City of Orange,152 the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of this type of policy.
In Green v. Superior Court,"5 3 the California Supreme Court recog-
nized an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. Whether
commercial tenants retain the same right as residential tenants to with-
hold rent if substantial code violations exist has not yet been answered
by the California appellate courts. 54 The survey of Elmwood's com-
mercial tenants complicates this question. The survey indicates that
152. 169 N.J. Super 288, 302-04, 404 A.2d 1186, 1193-94 (App. Div. 1979), affid,
83 N.J. Sup. Ct. 246, 259, 416 A.2d 353, 360 (1980). See Baar, supra note 132, at 830-
32.
153. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1974).
154. In Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 560, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624
(1980), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that, under Green, the implied war-
ranty of habitability did not apply to commercial leases and, therefore, commercial ten-
ants could not raise code violations as a defense to an eviction action. The court relied
on Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915), in which the California
Supreme Court ruled that tenants do not have the right to counter-claim for damages
for violation of a landlord's covenant to make repairs as a defense to a landlord's suit for
eviction for nonpayment of rent. 108 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 625. In
Schulman, a commercial tenant attempted to raise the warranty of habitability defense,
claiming $10,000 in damages caused by a leaking roof. The lease required the tenants to
maintain the premises except for the roof and other exterior areas.
In contrast, the First District Court of Appeal indicated in two prior cases that it
might extend the implied warranty of habitability to commercial tenants even without a
direct mandate from the California Supreme Court. In Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 948, 962, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69, 78 (1976), Division 1 of the First District declared
that the philosophy of the Green decision was "persuasive" if the premises "are consid-
ered as merely a small commercial outlet." In Four Seas Inv. Corp. v. International
Hotel Tenants Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 146 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (1978), Division
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almost two-thirds of the tenants are responsible under their leases for
maintenance and repairs.
Predictably, the consultants' recommendation proved objectionable
to both landlords and tenants. Landlords objected to the base rent ad-
justments, arguing that the BBA should increase all rents to 1981 or
current "comparable" market rents instead of to the 1981 mean Elm-
wood rent. Landlords also urged the BBA not to adopt an incremental
annual ceiling on base rent adjustments. Some landlords argued for a
return on current market value formula with market value determined
through standard appraisal techniques. Others argued for individual-
ized treatment of owners' petitions without a general formula.
Tenants, represented by the Elmwood Measure I Merchants' Com-
mittee, set forth several objections to the formula. They opposed any
adjustment of base rents other than that statutorily mandated by Mea-
sure I. Moreover, they argued that annual adjustments up to twenty
percent would create hardship for many tenants. Tenants also objected
to general automatic annual adjustments of landlords' NOI, arguing
that the BBA should allow only discretionary and individualized ad-
justments. They opposed any inflationary adjustments, in particular a
full inflation adjustment. Instead, they proposed that the BBA limit
any inflation adjustment to no more than forty percent of the CPI-U,
based upon a similar fair return formula developed by Santa Monica's
residential rent control board.
155
Tenants charged that the use of a district-wide mean NOI dependent
upon landlord-supplied registration data would lead to collusion
among landlords to manipulate rental data to create an artificially high
figure. They argued that the tenants' right to challenge landlords' re-
gistration statements and the penalties for nonregistration and fraud
were inadequate to protect tenants.
As alternative approaches, tenants variously suggested: 1) a partial
inflation adjustment of 1981 base year cash flow and an adjustment of
low, fixed rent leases, with a ceiling on both types of adjustments; 2) a
return on investment formula; and 3) discretionary adjustments on a
1 stated that "the warranty of habitability could, since Golden, extend to small commer-
cial operations if the facts warranted. .. ."
Two commentators have argued that the courts should apply the warranty of habita-
bility to commercial property. See generally Note, Commercial Leases: Behind the
Green Door, 12 PAc. L.J. 1067 (1981); Note, Landlord-Tenant-Should a Warranty of
Fitness be Implied in Commercial Leases?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 91 (1981).
155. For a discussion of the Santa Monica formula, see Baar, supra note 132, at 779,
813.
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case-by-case basis without the use of a set formula. As this synopsis
suggests, there was as little agreement between Elmwood's commercial
landlords and tenants over a fair return formula as there historically
has been between residential landlords and tenants.
Faced with these conflicting views, the BBA and its Fair Return
Subcommittee deliberated the alternatives proposed by Elmwood land-
lords and tenants. Meanwhile, the city's staff reviewed the legal and
administrative issues involved. In October 1983, the BBA adopted fair
return regulations for Elmwood. The BBA regulations largely reflect
the consultants' original recommendations. The BBA adopted the rec-
ommended NOI formula with the following significant changes.
The district-wide median, rather than the mean, 1981 base year NOI
per square foot serves as the basis for future fair return rent adjust-
ments.156 The consultants' survey indicated that the 1981 Elmwood
median rent per square foot was forty-eight cents, as contrasted with
the mean of fifty-eight cents.' 57 The BBA will calculate this figure only
after seventy, rather than fifty, percent of Elmwood's regulated busi-
nesses are properly registered and any tenant challenges to the land-
lords' registration statements are reviewed.' 58
Thereafter, the BBA will adjust automatically the base median NOI
annually for inflation-but only partially. The BBA will apply annual
increases in the San Francisco-Oakland CPI-U up to seven percent, but
by no more than half of the next seven percent. The BBA will not
include inflation above fourteen percent in the adjustments."' There-
fore, the BBA has set a ceiling of ten and one-half percent for inflation
adjustment of NOI.
Using the previous example, the formula works as follows in the first
year. The tenant renting one thousand square feet at forty cents per
square foot-$400 monthly-faces a rent increase of eight cents per
square foot-$S80 monthly-to raise the rent to the 1981 district me-
dian. If the median base NOI is eighty percent of the 1981 district
median, the median NOI would be thirty-eight cents per square foot.
If the San Francisco-Oakland CPI-U increases by ten and one-half per-
cent, the landlord would be entitled to a monthly rent increase of four
156. Berkeley, Cal., Board of Adjustments Fair Return Regulations under Elm-
wood Commercial Rent Controls § 611 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Elmwood Fair Re-
turn Regulations].
157. K. BAAR & W.D. KEATING, supra note 24, at 3.
158. Elmwood Fair Return Regulations, supra note 156, §§ 610, 611.
159. Id. § 612(a).
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cents per square foot: one thousand square feet multiplied by thirty-
eight cents multiplied by 0.105 percent equals $40. The BBA would
not adjust median NOI for inflation exceeding the ten and one-half
percent ceiling.
The BBA limited all cumulative allowable rent increases to which
landlords are entitled to the lesser of twenty-five percent or fifteen cents
per square foot annually. 1" These include rent increases for operating
and maintenance cost increases, amortized capital improvements, base
rent adjustments, and NOI inflation adjustments.
In the above example, even if the tenant paid all operating and main-
tenance cost increases and the landlord made no capital improvements,
the combination of the maximum allowable base rent adjustments and
the maximum allowable fair return adjustment would total thirty per-
cent (forty cents per square foot divided by eight cents per square foot
plus four cents per square foot) equalling a cumulative monthly rent
increase of $120 ($400 multiplied by 0.30). Under the cumulative an-
nual ceiling, the BBA would limit all rent increases, including increases
for increased operating and maintenance expenses incurred by the
landlord and any capital improvements made by the landlord, to only
$100 ($400 multiplied by twenty-five percent). Assuming that the ten-
ant paid all operating and maintenance expenses and the landlord
made no capital improvements, the BBA would postpone $20 of the
$120 allowable monthly rent increase until the following year. Whether
the BBA would apply the ceiling depends upon whether the landlord
pays for certain costs, whether the costs increase, whether the landlord
was entitled to a base rent adjustment to the 1981 median, and how
much of an inflation adjustment is required.
The BBA retained the banking provision for NOI inflation adjust-
ments, allowing landlords entitled to automatic annual adjustments
that do not actually increase their rents to current tenants to pass them
on later to new tenants.161
Both landlords and tenants won and lost contested issues. Land-
lords retained their right to base rent adjustments, but not to compara-
ble rents. Landlords retained their right to an inflation adjustment of
NOI, but not to a full inflation adjustment. The tenants' most impor-
tant gain was the imposition of the overall annual ceiling on adjust-
ments, even though it was higher than they advocated. In comparison,
160. Id. § 615.
161. Id. at 614.
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Berkeley's residential rent stabilization regulations limit individual rent
adjustments for capital improvements, base rent adjustments, and
maintenance of NOI excluding inflation, to fifteen percent annually.1 62
In addition, Berkeley's residential landlords are entitled to an annual
general adjustment, which ranged from zero to nine percent from 1981
to 1984.
The BBA issued the administrative regulations implementing the
fair return formula in July 1984. To date, no parties have filed legal
challenges contesting the formula's validity.
V. PROPOSED MUNICIPAL COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL
ORDINANCES
A. San Francisco
The possible adoption of commercial rent stabilization to protect
neighborhood-serving businesses in San Francisco, where commercial
gentrification is a controversial question, first arose in public hearings
in 1981. Commercial rent stabilization legislation, however, has not
yet been introduced or considered by San Francisco's Board of
Supervisors.
B. New York City
In New York City, the revival of commercial rent control became a
city-wide issue beginning in 1980. Small neighborhood-serving busi-
nesses in gentrifying neighborhoods complained that landlords forced
them to leave or liquidate their businesses in order to make way for
businesses able to afford higher rents. These new businesses provide
goods and services to a higher-income population of newcomers. 163 In
response, local commercial rent control legislation entitled "The Small
Business Preservation Act" (SBPA)' 6" was introduced in the New
York City Council that year.
Unlike its World War II predecessor, this proposal was targeted at
"long-established neighborhood small businesses." The proposed legis-
162. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization Board Regulations § 1274(b) (1981).
163. See C. HARTMAN, W.D. KEATING & R. LEGATES, DISPLACEMENT: How TO
FIGHT IT 87-88 (1982); Gorlin, Open Season on Small Business Tenants, 9 CITY LIMITs,
May 1984, at 5.
164. Proposed New York City Local Law No. 658 (Sept. 27, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as SBPA]. Other versions of similar legislation were introduced earlier in the New
York City Council.
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lative findings recognize the importance of controlling rent levels to
make possible the continued existence of the small businesses essential
to New York neighborhoods. 165 To accomplish this anti-displacement
goal, the SBPA would regulate only the rents of the following types of
"commercial premises": 1) retail stores occupying ten thousand square
feet or less at street level or one floor above street level; 2) professional,
service, or other offices occupying ten thousand square feet or less; and
3) manufacturing, assembling, or processing premises occupying
twenty-five thousand square feet or less. 166 The proposal does not ex-
empt newly constructed premises.
The proposed legislation entitles protected small business tenants to
renew existing leases for a minimum term of seven years. 167 The pro-
posal limits annual rent increases to the lesser of ten percent or the
prime mortgage interest rate plus three percent.16 If a landlord had
not raised a tenant's rent within three years prior to the expiration of
the lease, then an adjustment of five percent for each year prior to this
three year period is provided and is not subject to this limitation. 169
No additional operating and maintenance cost pass throughs are per-
mitted, except for real property tax increases that landlords must ap-
portion according to each affected tenant's space. 170
The proposal guarantees landlords a "reasonable rate of return."
165. Id. § 1.
[Tihe viability of a neighborhood, and the welfare of the people who live and work
there, may be largely dependent on the on-going businesses serving the neighbor-
hood. The [New York City] council further finds that an emergency exists as a
result of the shortage of commercial space for rent in many neighborhoods and that
said shortage has caused profiteering, speculation and other economically disrup-
tive practices causing hardship, dislocation and the exaction of unjust, unreasona-
ble and oppressive commercial rents. Often, long-established neighborhood small
businesses are, therefore, displaced or forced to go out of business. This not only
imposes a hardship on the business affected, but deprives the community of a val-
ued source of essential goods and services and often results in the imposition of
inflated charges for the provision of the very same goods and services by a succes-
sor business. Therefore, in recognition of the aforementioned public emergency,
the council finds that the rentals charged for such properties must be limited to
insure the economic stability, neighborhood viability and the general public
welfare.
Id.
166. Id. § 2 (adding § YYY 51-1.0(a) to the New York City Administrative Code).
167. Ido § YYY 51-2.0(b).
168. Id. § YYY 51-2.0(a).
169. Id. § YYY 51-1.0(0.
170. Id. § YYY 51-6.0.
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This is defined alternately as the lesser of either: 1) the rent sufficient
to pay all actual operating, maintenance, and repair costs and a return
on capital value equal to seven percent of the previous tax year's total
assessed value plus an additional three percent if improvements had
been made; or 2) a net annual return of three percent plus the prevail-
ing annual New York interest rates on new first mortgages based on
the landlord's equity investment, defined as the down payment plus
any repayment of mortgage principal.17 1
A vacancy decontrol provision is provided under which landlords
can charge market rents for new leases for vacated space. Severe pen-
alties are provided for any landlord found guilty of tenant harassment
that causes the tenant to vacate. 172 Landlords may refuse to renew a
tenant's lease if they wish to occupy the premises to expand their own
business when they have owned a majority interest in that business for
at least four years and it has been located nearby for at least two
years. 1
73
The proposed law limits security deposits 74 and provides penalties
for illegal overcharges.1 75 The proposal makes any lease provisions
waiving tenant rights unenforceable.1 76
The proposed law is partially self-enforcing because there is no re-
quirement that landlords register or seek prior approval for rent in-
creases. Landlords are not required to notify tenants of their rights
under the law. Administrative remedies are provided if a tenant claims
that a landlord intentionally overcharged,1 77 harassed the tenant into
vacating, 178 re-occupied the premises in bad faith,1 79 or if a landlord
applied for a hardship rent increase and claims that the rent is insuffi-
cient to provide a reasonable rate of return. 8 ° New York City's De-
partment of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), which
171. Id. § YYY 51-8.0.
172. Id. § YYY 51-2.0(e). The landlord is subject to damages of the greater of
either $50,000 or 10 times the average of the proposed rent of the new tenant.
173. Id. § YYY 51-3.0.
174. Id. § YYY 51-2.0(0. Security deposits are limited to a maximum of three
months rent.
175. Id. § YYY 51-4.0(a).
176. Id. § YYY 51-6.0(a).
177. Id. § YYY 51-4.0(a).
178. Id. § YYY 51-2.0(e).
179. Id. § YYY 51-3.0(a).
180. Id. § YYY 51-8.0.
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has administered the city's residential rent control and stabilization
programs in the past would administer these provisions. 81 Tenants
and landlords could seek judicial review of the Department's adminis-
trative decisions and alleged violations of the law. This legislation
would not apply retroactively. The proposed law would affect only
those lease renewals occurring after its adoption.1 82
In 1984, companion legislation authorizing local option commercial
rent controls was introduced in the New York State Legislature.183
The major difference between this proposed state legislation and the
New York City proposal is that the former proposal would protect
small businesses defined according to the number of employees-one
hundred or fewer.
To date, neither proposal has been enacted in the face of opposition
from the real estate industry and the incumbent Mayor of New York
City. In the face of the Mayor's adamant opposition, the New York
City Council's Committee on Economic Development did not vote on
the bill after conducting a public hearing in February 1984. The New
York State Legislature's Assembly Housing Committee approved the
bill in March 1984, but it made no further progress.184
Real estate industry's opposition to the contemporary revival of
commercial rent controls is based on the same arguments that the in-
dustry invoked to oppose the post-World War II commercial rent con-
trols.1 85 This debate is likely to continue as long as evidence exists of
continuing commercial gentrification and as long as alternative ap-
proaches, such as zoning controls, remain inadequate to protect small
neighborhood-serving businesses from displacement.
The potential introduction of city-wide commercial rent control
targeted to small neighborhood-serving businesses in major cities like
New York City and San Francisco, which suffer from commercial gen-
trification, raises important issues concerning the application of Berke-
181. In 1983, the administration of New York City's residential rent control and
rent stabilization systems was transferred to the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Development, effective April 1, 1984. Rent Control-Tenant Protec-
tion-New York City, ch. 403, §§ 22-23, 1983 N.Y. Laws 752.
182. SBPA, supra note 164, § YYY 51-1.0(c).
183. A.B. 6983 & S.B. 6983.
184. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984, at R7, col. 1. See also Gorlin, supra note 163.
185. See Rosenberg, You Can't Afford to Ignore Commercial Rent Controls, 17
REAL ESTATE TODAY, June 1984, at 34. The office industry successfully opposed fed-
eral commercial rent control during World War II. See SCHULTZ & SIMMONS, OFFICES
IN THE SKY (1959).
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ley's Elmwood experiment. Measure I and New York City's proposed
SBPA differ in several significant respects.
C. Measure I and SPBA Compared
1. Coverage
Measure I covers all businesses, large or small, within the geographi-
cal confines of a neighborhood district. The SBPA is limited only to
the protection of small businesses, defined primarily by size (square
footage) and location, or, alternately, by the number of employees.
The city-wide SBPA is not restricted to neighborhoods where displace-
ment is particularly severe. Measure I retroactively modified some, but
not all, pre-existing leases. The SBPA only applies prospectively to
lease renewals.
2. Vacancy Decontrol
Measure I does not provide for vacancy decontrol. The BBA's fair
return regulations provide that landlords may pass "banked" rent in-
creases on to new tenants. The SBPA, unlike its predecessor, provides
only for limited vacancy decontrol. Vacant units, once re-rented at
market rents, are subject again to controls.
3. Notice and Registration
Measure I requires all landlords to notify tenants of their rights as a
condition for rent increases and explain the basis for all rent increases.
The SBPA does not require notice. The BBA requires landlord regis-
tration as a condition for eligibility for fair return rent increases. While
the SBPA requires landlords to petition the HPD for hardship rent
increases, it does not require registration.
4. Rent Adjustments
Neither statute provides for automatic annual general rent adjust-
ments. Measure I and the SBPA both allow landlords to increase rents
at their discretion within the statutory guidelines. Measure I strictly
limits rent adjustments to pass throughs of operating, maintenance,
and amortized capital improvement costs. The SBPA does not limit
maximum rent adjustments to these cost pass throughs and provides
for the additional automatic pass through of increased property taxes.
Both statutes provide for differing five percent base rent adjustments
when rents had not been raised recently.
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5. Fair Return
Measure I does not contain a fair return formula. The SBPA con-
tains a fair return formula. The BBA adopted a MNOI formula par-
tially tied to inflation and limited by the twenty-five percent annual
ceiling for all cumulative rent increases. The SBPA formula provides
for a guaranteed percentage return on investment in which equity is
defined either as the lesser of assessed value or the landlord's down
payment and mortgage principal repayment. There is neither an infla-
tion adjustment nor a ceiling in this formula.
6. Just Cause Evictions
Within the minimum seven year control period, the SBPA allows
only one basis for lease nonrenewal: a landlord retains the limited
right to use the premises for the expansion of his own nearby business.
Measure I provides eight just causes for eviction, which do not include
the landlord's right to reclaim the premises for his own commercial
use.
7. Expiration
Measure I could expire only by repeal through voter referendum.
The SBPA, as emergency regulatory legislation, would be subject to
periodic renewal by the New York State Legislature and the New York
City Council.
8. Administration
Both measures provide for partial administrative enforcement by
city agencies, as well as judicial review. New York City's HPD retains
broader jurisdiction than the BBA because of the SBPA's vacancy de-
control and eviction provisions.
Perhaps the most significant structural policy issue posed by Mea-
sure I for much larger cities like New York City and San Francisco is
whether the cities should limit commercial rent controls, designed to
protect small, neighborhood-serving businesses against displacement,
only to those neighborhood commercial districts where the cities can
identify serious problems such as low vacancy rates, extraordinarily
high rent increases, or the eviction of existing small businesses that
cause or threaten displacement. If so, city planning departments could
study and identify these districts. In San Francisco, the City Planning
Department identified neighborhood-serving commercial districts
when it undertook its rezoning process.
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In 1983, New York City's Department of City Planning conducted a
similar study of two neighborhoods undergoing gentrification: the Up-
per West Side of Manhattan and Park Slope in Brooklyn. Based upon
its interpretation of 1970 and 1980 census data, the Department con-
cluded that little evidence existed of harmful residential displacement
caused by gentrification. The Department also determined that the in-
stitution of commercial rent controls to protect neighborhood retailers
was unnecessary because neighborhood commercial patterns had not
changed markedly.' 86 Critics have disputed both the accuracy of the
study and its conclusions concerning the extent of displacement and
the need for preventive regulation.' 87
The Elmwood experience does suggest that, before city-wide adop-
tion of commercial rent control, cities of this size should consider ex-
perimental adoption in one or more neighborhoods when it is
particularly necessary to allow for an evaluation of the program's im-
pact, administration, and effectiveness. Berkeley's evaluation of the
Elmwood experiment and its possible expansion to other Berkeley
neighborhood commercial districts serves as a useful model for other
cities facing this dilemma.
VI. THE IMPACT OF MEASURE I
To date, the Berkeley Department of Planning and Community De-
velopment has not yet completed its initial evaluation of Measure I's
impact. Several issues deserve consideration.
First and foremost is the short-term impact on rents and the contin-
ued occupancy of those tenants renting space in Elmwood in June
1982. If tenants vacate subsequently, the Department should explore
the reasons for their departure and their possible relationship to Mea-
sure I. These reasons could include retirement of the owner, an attrac-
tive offer from a buyer, relocation to a better location outside
Elmwood, unprofitability, and bankruptcy. The Department should
profile the type of replacement tenants to determine what effect Mea-
sure I, as opposed to Elmwood's zoning, has on this substitution
process.
A related issue is the distribution of benefits to Elmwood's tenants.
186. See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, PRIVATE REIN-
VESTMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1984).
187. See Marcuse, Measuring Gentrification's Impact, 9 Crm LIMITS, May 1984, at
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The Department must track all rent increases to determine how Mea-
sure I's rent controls benefit different types of tenants.
The Department should analyze Measure I's impact on sales and
transfers by landlords and any subleases by tenants. Transfers by land-
lords indicate Measure I's impact on investment in a regulated market.
Subleases by tenants could pose administrative and legal problems.
Measure I's controls apply equally to tenants, subtenants, lessees, sub-
lessees, and any other persons entitled to the use or occupancy of any
units. ' If tenants negotiate subleases, the Department should deter-
mine whether the terms of the sublease comply with the terms of Mea-
sure I and the BBA regulations. Illegal subleases, whether negotiated
by landlords or tenants, would violate the purpose and undermine the
impact of Measure I.
The Department should study the impact of Measure I on new con-
struction, substantial rehabilitation, and conversions to measure its im-
pact on investment and tenure. Because Elmwood already is fully
developed and the 1984 rezoning restricts density, little space remains
for the construction of new commercial rental space. Substantial reha-
bilitation is much more likely. 189
Irrespective of whether landlords remodel existing commercial
space, tenure conversion is a more likely phenomenon. Reportedly, the
owners of several stores, including those remodelling vacant space, in-
tend to convert these stores into commercial condominiums. While
owners have developed commercial condominiums in the San Fran-
cisco market, this is a relatively new development in Berkeley. Like
the debate concerning residential rent control, the causal connection
between rent control and condominium conversions remains unproven.
The impact on Elmwood tenants depends upon whether they purchase
or vacate their premises and on the terms of either alternative. 190
In view of the possible conversion of commercial rental space into
condominiums, if Berkeley decides to prevent the displacement of com-
mercial tenants that cannot afford to purchase their building space,
then the city must consider the regulation of commercial condominium
conversions. While numerous California communities, including
188. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 4(e).
189. Measure I regulates the creation of new units through the subdivision and con-
solidation of existing space. Id. § 5(d).
190. For an analysis of the comparative costs and benefits of office rental versus
ownership by small business, see Tracy, Owning v. Renting Office Space: A Financial
Comparison, 11 REAL ESTATE REv., Winter 1982, at 86.
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Berkeley, have regulated residential condominium conversions, 191 no
American city has regulated the conversion of commercial rental space
into commercial condominiums.
The alternative to regulation, if Berkeley desires to encourage build-
ing ownership by Elmwood's small neighborhood-serving businesses,
exists in some form of subsidized purchase financing or loan guaran-
tees. In the absence of state or federal subsidy programs for this pur-
pose, however, it is unlikely that the city alone could undertake such a
program in view of its extremely limited budgetary resources.
The number and reasons behind the filing of petitions with the BBA
and their outcome should shed light on any administrative problems
that arise during implementation of Measure I, including the fair re-
turn formula adopted in October 1983. Berkeley should calculate the
financial and personnel costs to the city for the administration of Mea-
sure I.
Finally, the city should analyze the number and cause for evictions
to determine a pattern for evictions and landlord compliance with
Measure I's eviction controls. Study of these matters should provide
valuable data with which to study the effectiveness of existing and pro-
posed commercial rent control plans.
VII. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MEASURE I
COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL
Measure I, like other rent control statutes including New York's for-
mer commercial rent control laws, is susceptible to legal challenge on
various grounds. Potential issues subject to judicial review are re-
viewed below. The Article examines judicial precedents, including re-
cent California appellate residential rent control decisions, to
determine the likelihood that the courts will invalidate Measure I.
A. Basis for Police Power Regulation
Landlords may challenge the basis for the exercise of Berkeley's mu-
nicipal police power for the regulation of commercial rents. Unlike
New York's earlier statutes, Measure I is not based upon the existence
of an emergency. In Birkenfeld, the California Supreme Court rejected
191, See Note, Municipal Regulation of Condominium Conversions in California, 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1979).
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the emergency requirement for residential rent control. 92 The court
substituted a rational basis test under which the courts presume that
residential rent controls are a legitimate exercise of the police power
unless there is a "complete absence of even a debatable rational basis
for the legislative determination . . . that rent control is a reasonable
means of counteracting harms and dangers to the public health and
welfare emanating from a housing shortage." '193 The California
Supreme Court recently reiterated this presumption in Carson
Mobilehome Park Owners Association v. City of Carson,'9 4 when it up-
held the validity of local mobile home rent control.
Courts should apply this presumption to commercial rent control.
This means that landlords should have a very heavy burden of proof to
overcome. Measure I's primary bases for enactment are to protect
Elmwood's commercial tenants from rent increases that are not justi-
fied by cost increases and to enable those tenants to continue to provide
services to residents of the district without undue price increases, ex-
pansion of trade, or liquidation.195
Under the Birkenfeld test, landlords should have to prove that rent
increases, both actual and proposed, were in fact reasonably related to
landlords' actual cost increases and that Elmwood tenants were not
threatened by rent increases, nonrenewal of leases, and trade expansion
problems. The Elmwood tenant survey cited earlier, while not conclu-
sive, indicates a pattern of rent increases between 1979 and 1981 that
exceeds inflation. This pattern may provide, however debatable, a ra-
tional basis for the enactment of commercial rent control.196
While Measure I does not include a low vacancy rate or shortage of
space as relevant factors, evidence showing their existence in Elmwood
as of 1982 could buttress further the presumption of validity of munici-
pal regulation.'97 The 1956 and 1960 New York Court of Appeals de-
cisions that rejected similar landlord challenges to New York's
192. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 146-50, 550 P.2d 1001, 1018-23, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 481-86
(1976). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
193. 17 Cal. 3d at 161, 550 P.2d at 1024, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Landlords failed to
overcome this presumption of regulatory rationality. Id. at 164, 550 P.2d at 1026-27,
130 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
194. 35 Cal. 3d 184, 186 n.4, 672 P.2d 1297, 1299 n.4, 197 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286 n.4
(1983). The plaintiffs, mobile home park owners, did not challenge the basis for the
adoption of the ordinance. Id.
195. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 2.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
197. The City of Berkeley attempted to prove a shortage of commercial space in
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commercial rent control laws substantially weakened by decontrol,1 98
and these California Supreme Court decisions on residential rent con-
trol, suggest that this type of challenge is unlikely to succeed.
B. Impairment of Contracts
Challengers may contest that Measure I unconstitutionally impairs
pre-existing contracts. Measure I exempts leases executed prior to Oc-
tober 1, 1981, including those with renewal options that are exercised
by either a landlord or tenant.' 99 Measure I, however, modifies pre-
existing leases if landlords increased rents between October 1, 1980,
and October 1, 1981, in excess of the San Francisco-Oakland CPI-U.
Measure I reduces the base rent to the prior rent plus the CPI-U in-
crease "to preserve certain businesses which have recently received
such high rent increases that they would-but for this subsection-find
it necessary to take steps contrary to the purposes of this
Ordinance." 2"
Additionally, Measure I rolls back all other increases that occurred
from October 1, 1981, to the date of enactment-June 8, 1982. A
rollback to a pre-existing base date was intended to preclude landlords
with month-to-month leases from raising rents in anticipation of Mea-
sure I's enactment, which, if allowed, would frustrate Measure I's very
purpose. Measure I's October 1, 1981, base date for this nine month
rollback was selected because this was the approximate time that the
campaign for commercial rent stabilization began in the Elmwood dis-
trict.21 Those landlords whose rollback period rent increases were re-
voked retroactively also may claim that their contracts were impaired
unconstitutionally.
A long line of federal and state rent control precedents suggests that
this argument will not prevail. Twentieth Century Associates20 2 is a
leading New York Court of Appeals case that rejected this claim when
it upheld the constitutionality of New York's commercial rent control
laws.
Berkeley in defense of Measure I's challenged predecessor. See Rue-Ell, 147 Cal. App.
3d at 91, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
199. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 13(a).
200. Id. § 13(b).
201. Id. § 5(b).
202. 294 N.Y. at 580-81, 63 N.E.2d at 177. See supra notes 88-91 and accompany-
ing text.
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New York's Commercial Space Rent Control Act took effect Janu-
ary 24, 1945, and rolled commercial rents back twenty-three months to
March 1, 1943.203 The Business Space Rent Control Act took effect
March 28, 1945, and rolled business space rents back nine months to
June 1, 1944.21 Unlike Measure I, these two statutes provided land-
lords a fifteen percent adjustment over base rents.
In Twentieth Century Associates, the plaintiff, a commercial landlord,
claimed that the commercial rent control rollback constituted an un-
constitutional impairment of contracts. The court rejected this claim
on two grounds. First, citing the statutory preamble, the court con-
cluded that commercial leases were not freely bargained for con-
tracts. 20 5 Second, the court held that the system of temporary rent
control enacted by the legislature, including the reduction of rents dur-
ing the rollback period, represented a "reasonable and legitimate rem-
edy."206 In upholding the statute, the court relied upon the prior
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court that upheld the constitutionality of New York's 1920
emergency residential rent controls against landlord claims that they
violated due process by substantially impairing pre-existing leases
when they invalidated rent increases.20 7
State and federal appellate courts consistently have upheld residen-
tial rent control laws that have rolled rents back retroactively to a prior
base date against contract impairment claims. For example, in Huard
203. ECSRCL, supra note 65, § 8522(e).
204. EBSRCL, supra note 66, § 8552(c).
205. Twentieth Century Associates, 294 N.Y. at 580-81, 63 N.E.2d at 180. The pre-
amble stated:
Proceeding, as we must in this case, upon the assumption that the Legislature in-
tended the act to be retroactive, we find in the material before the Legislature am-
ple evidence that unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive leases and agreements in
large volume had been exacted by landlords from tenants under the stress of pre-
vailing conditions accelerated by the war for some time prior to the enactment of
the statute.
Id. The court noted that:
The evils denounced in the statute flowed, not merely from leases which might
thereafter be executed, but even more directly from leases already made, and these
evils could not be remedied by regulations purely prospective in their application,
although the regulations adopted were only retroactive in that they applied to fu-
ture payments of rent under pre-existing leases.
Id. at 581, 63 N.E.2d at 180.
206. Id. at 580, 63 N.E.2d at 180.
207. See supra note 89.
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v. Forrest Street Housing, Inc.,2' the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld the nine month rollback of controlled rents in Cambridge
in 1970, citing Twentieth Century Associates as precedent. In Freeport
Randall Co. v. Herman,2°" the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
rollback provision of New York State's Emergency Tenant Protection
Act against a contract impairment claim. In Birkenfeld, the California
Supreme Court found a twenty month rollback "appropriate and
reasonable."21o
As indicated in the Rue-Ell21' decision that upheld the validity of
Berkeley's 1978 to 1979 property tax rebate initiative, the United States
Supreme Court, in several recent decisions, has outlined a three-step
analytical process for judicial review of contract impairment claims.
Rue-Ell itself is distinguishable because the court found no substantial
impairment of commercial leases.
Troy, Ltd. v. Renna,212 provides the best recent example of the appli-
cation of this analysis to a regulatory statute. Condominium convert-
ers challenged the provisions of New Jersey's Senior Citizens and
Disabled Protected Tenancy Act that retroactively extended protection
against eviction to eligible elderly and disabled tenants. The challeng-
ers claimed that the Act unconstitutionally impaired their contracts.
In rejecting this claim, the Third Circuit applied the analysis outlined
by the United States Supreme Court in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power and Light Co.213
The court concluded that, even if a substantial contract impairment
existed, a significant and legitimate remedial public purpose existed for
the regulatory legislation.2" 4 The court cited the legislative finding that
detailed the harm resulting from relocation of elderly and disabled ten-
208. 366 Mass. 203, 207-08, 316 N.E.2d 505, 507-08 (1974) (citing Twentieth Cen-
tury Associates, 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 696
(1946)).
209. 56 N.Y.2d 832, 834, 438 N.E.2d 99, 101, 452 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1982).
210. 17 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 550 P.2d at 1022-28, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92. See also
Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners' Ass'n v. City of Oceanside, 157 Cal. App. 3d 887,
-, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251-52 (1984) (court upheld mobile home park rent control
ordinance's rollback provision as just and reasonable).
211. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 88-87, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 923. See supra notes 121-27 and
accompanying text.
212. 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984).
213. 727 F.2d at 297 (construing Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. 400, 410-12
(1983)). See supra note 123.
214. 727 F.2d at 297-98.
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ants,215 and concluded that the regulatory clause was a necessary and
reasonable means to achieve this purpose.
Applying the Third Circuit's analysis to Measure I and assuming
that a substantial impairment of at least some commercial leases in
Elmwood exists, it is likely that a court will reject this argument. Mea-
sure I's stated purposes meet the test of Energy Reserves for a signifi-
cant and legitimate remedial public purpose. Unless Measure I raises
procedural due process problems, it is likely that the courts will find
that Measure I's regulatory scheme is necessary and reasonable to
achieve its purpose of protecting neighborhood-serving businesses from
displacement.
In Fleeman v. Case,216 the Florida Supreme Court held that a Flor-
ida statute designed to protect condominium owners could be applied
prospectively, but not retroactively, because its retroactive application
would impair pre-existing contracts. The Florida Legislature had
barred the use of escalation clauses based on commodity or consumer
prices in leases for recreational facilities or management contracts for
condominiums.
Elmwood landlords may invoke Fleeman to argue that pre-existing
leases with escalator clauses, including those tied to the CPI-U, cannot
be modified retroactively. In view of the rent control precedents unani-
mously rejecting this view, it is unlikely that the courts will follow
Fleeman.
C. General and Individual Rent Adjustments
Elmwood landlords may assert that the absence of a guaranteed an-
nual general rent adjustment, such as that contained in Berkeley's resi-
dential rent stabilization ordinance, means that Measure I fails to meet
the requirements set forth by the California Supreme Court in
Birkenfeld. In Birkenfeld, the court invalidated Berkeley's 1972 resi-
dential rent control initiative in part because it required individual rent
adjustments for all regulated units, estimated at approximately sixteen
thousand, under an administrative system that the court found facially
inadequate.217
215. Id. at 298.
216. 342 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
217. 17 Cal. 3d at 166-74, 550 P.2d at 1028-33, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 492-97. See supra
notes 125, 192-198 and accompanying text.
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In Carson,218 however, the California Supreme Court held that a
general rent adjustment mechanism is not constitutionally required.
Carson addressed a mobile home rent control ordinance that provided
that an appointed Mobilehome Park Rental Review Board could grant
"just, fair, and reasonable" rent increases based on twelve statutory
factors upon the petition of a mobile home park owner. Because only
thirty-two regulated mobile home parks existed in the city, the court
concluded that the Board could review annually any and all petitions
within a statutory deadline mandating its final decision within a 105
day period from the submission of the landlord's application.219
Unlike the mobile home rent control ordinance challenged in Car-
son, Measure I allows landlords to increase rents for increased operat-
ing, maintenance, and capital improvement expenses at their discretion
without petitioning the BBA for prior approval. Under the BBA's fair
return formula, although Elmwood landlords must petition the BBA
for additional rent increases, the BBA will apply the formula automati-
cally. This will make the BBA's review very efficient, provided that the
landlord is properly registered.
Under the BBA's regulations, the BBA must reach a final decision
on all petitions within 105 days from the receipt of a landlord's petition
and the mailing of a notice to each affected tenant.22 ° The BBA can
consolidate hearings for petitions involving units in the same build-
ing.221 It is estimated that Elmwood's regulated commercial market
includes only eighty-four units owned by twenty-three landlords.
Under these circumstances, the courts should find no serious proce-
dural defects that will deny landlords allowable rent adjustments
within a reasonable period of time.
D. Taking
Landlords have argued unsuccessfully that the regulation of rental
property is an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. This
218. 35 Cal. 3d at 194, 672 P.2d at 1302, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90. See supra note
194 and accompanying text.
219. Id. at 193, 672 P.2d at 1301, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
220. Berkeley, Cal., Board of Adjustment Elmwood Commercial Rent Stabilization
and Eviction Protection Regulations §§ 852(a), (b), (c) & 858(a) (1983). Upon receipt
of a landlord's petition and the mailing of notice of the petition to the tenant, the tenant
is allowed up to 30 days to respond, the Board must schedule a hearing within 30 days
after this deadline, and the Board must make its final decision not later than 45 days
after the hearing.
221. Id. § 852(c).
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argument is premised upon Justice Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon that "while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." '222
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving challenges to
the regulation of real property based upon a taking theory suggest that
commercial landlords may assert that Measure I constitutes an uncon-
stitutional taking.223
In Finn, the Second Circuit rejected a taking argument in a challenge
to the constitutionality of New York's Business Space Act.224 Under
Finn, it is doubtful that courts will hold that Measure I constitutes an
unlawful taking. Measure I guarantees landlords an automatic pass
through of all operating and maintenance costs, and a fair return. The
taking standards enunciated recently by the United States and Califor-
nia Supreme Courts require a permanent governmental physical occu-
pation of the regulated property or, alternately, the denial of the
reasonable use of an owner's property to the extent that its value is
virtually eliminated.225 Measure I results in neither effect on Elm-
wood's commercial landlords.
In Troy, the Third Circuit rejected the regulatory taking argument
based upon an analysis of the taking precedents.226 The court noted
that the United States Supreme Court declared specifically in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ,227 that New York's original
rent control laws did not constitute a taking. These precedents suggest
that the courts will refuse to find that Measure I constitutes an uncon-
stitutional taking.
222. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
223. See, eg., Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25
WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 3 (1983) (discussion of recent developments in the
taking doctrine and the resulting implications); Note, Finding a Taking: Standards for
Fairness, 16 U.S.F.L. Rav. 743 (1982) (analysis of the regulatory taking issue).
224. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 126-27, 136-
38 (1978) (government's regulation must be reasonably related to a substantial public
purpose; Court found no taking).
225. See, eg., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979), affid, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
226. 727 F.2d 287, 301-03 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 112-15 and accompany-
ing text.
227. 727 F.2d at 301 (construing Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)).
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E. Equal Protection
Elmwood's landlords may assert that, because they are the only
commercial landlords singled out for regulation by the City of Berke-
ley, neighborhood-based rent control violates their right to equal pro-
tection. Because Measure I is the first American municipal rent
control law limited to a particular neighborhood, no direct precedents
exist.
The courts, however, repeatedly have rejected similar landlord con-
tentions based on the exemption of certain classes of residential land-
lords from controls.22 8  As long as a rational basis exists for the
classification of regulated and nonregulated properties, the courts defer
to the legislative bodies' regulatory decisions. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals summarily upheld the exemption of piers,
docks, and wharf properties from the business space rent controls.229
Measure I contains a reasonable basis for the experimental regula-
tion of commercial rents when a demonstrable problem exists. The
courts probably will defer to the legislative choice to limit regulation
on this basis.
F. Fair Return
1. Statutory Formula
Some rent control statutes, like the New York commercial rent con-
trol laws, define what constitutes a fair return. Others, including Cali-
fornia's local residential rent statutes adopted since 1978, guarantee
landlords a fair return, but do not define the term. Instead, administra-
tive bodies like the BBA, or the courts are entrusted with this task.
For example, Berkeley's residential rent stabilization law guarantees
landlords "a fair return on investment," but delegates responsibility for
its definition and application to the BRSB. In reviewing landlords' ap-
plications for individual rent adjustments, the BRSB was mandated
statutorily to consider all relevant factors, including ten specified
228. See Baar, supra note 132, at 756-58. The California appellate courts have up-
held the exemption of certain owner-occupants in Berkeley and luxury rental housing in
Los Angeles against equal protection challenges. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 148
Cal. App. 3d 267, 271, 195 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (1983), aft'd, - Cal. 3d -, 693 P.2d
261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984); Palos Verdes Shores Mobile Estates, Ltd. v City of Los
Angeles, 142 Cal. App. 3d 362, 190 Cal. Rptr. 866, 872-73 (1983).
229. A.E.F.'s, 295 N.Y. at 381, 68 N.E.2d at 177. See supra note 91.
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factors.2
30
Landlords have asserted that a rent regulation ordinance like Mea-
sure I that lacks a statutory fair return formula is constitutionally defi-
cient. Measure I simply delegates the duty of defining and applying a
fair return on investment to the BBA.23'1 In Birkenfeld, the California
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument. The court concluded that
"[b]y stating its purpose and providing a nonexclusive illustrative list
of relevant factors to be considered, the charter amendment provides
constitutionally sufficient legislative guidance to the Board for its deter-
mination of petitions for adjustments of maximum rents. '2 32
In Carson, landlords asserted that the challenged mobile home rent
control ordinance unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to a
citizens' board because it contained no specific fair return formula.
The ordinance guaranteed landlords "just, fair, and reasonable" rents
and provided the board with a nonexclusive list of twelve relevant fac-
tors to consider in reviewing landlord petitions.233 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinance was not rendered uncon-
stitutional because it failed to articulate a formula for determining
what constitutes a just and reasonable return. The court reasoned that
rent control agencies are not obliged by either the state or federal con-
stitution to fix rents by application of any particular method or
formula.234
Under Birkenfeld and Carson, Measure I is not unconstitutional on
its face merely because the definition of a fair return is delegated to the
BBA. Unlike its Berkeley and Carson residential counterparts, no list
of relevant factors exists for the BBA to consider. Challengers may
assert that the lack of statutory fair return standards provides insuffi-
cient guidance. As long as the BBA defines a fair return formula that
meets Measure I's purpose and provides landlords with a fair return,
Measure I should pass constitutional muster as applied. 235
230. See Fisher, 148 Cal. App. 3d at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42 n.4 (10 factors
listed).
231. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 6(c).
232. 17 Cal. 3d at 168, 550 P.2d 1028-29, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93. See supra notes
125, 192-98, & 217 and accompanying text.
233. 35 Cal. 3d at 188, 672 P.2d at 1298, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 287. See supra notes 194,
218-19 and accompanying text.
234. 35 Cal. 3d at 191, 672 P.2d at 1300, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
235. Palos Verdes, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 370, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73, supports this
view. See supra note 228.
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2. The NOI Formula
a. Market Value versus NOI
Landlords have argued repeatedly that the only permissible fair re-
turn rent control formula is a return on market value formula. If this
opinion is correct, the BBA's adoption of a NOI formula may be vul-
nerable. A majority of appellate courts that have considered this fair
return issue, however, have rejected this assertion. As the California
Supreme Court stated in Carson, the federal constitution does not re-
quire the adoption of any particular formula.23 6
In Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Fee,2 37 the New Jersey Supreme
Court rejected the return on market value approach as "circular". Sev-
eral California and Massachusetts appellate courts have reiterated this
view."' Little likelihood exists that courts will treat challenges to
Measure I any differently.
b. Inflation Indexing
A more serious challenge to the BBA's NOI formula is the argument
that, in order to provide a fair return to landlords, the BBA must not
only maintain NOI, but that it must fully index NOI for inflation.
In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,2 39 the California Court of Appeal held
that Berkeley's residential rent stabilization ordinance was facially in-
valid because it did not expressly guarantee residential landlords an
inflationary adjustment through annual general cost pass through rent
236. 35 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 672 P.2d at 1300, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 287. See supra notes
194, 233-34 and accompanying text.
237. 78 N.J. 200, 213-14, 394 A.2d 65, 71 (1978). See Baar, supra note 132, at 798.
238. See Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners' Ass'n v. City of Oceanside, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 887, -, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246-47 (1984); Palos Verdes Shores Mobile Es-
tates, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 142 Cal. App. 3d 362, 370-71, 190 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871
(1983); Cotati Alliance for Better Hous. v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287-88,
195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829-30 (1983); Niles v. Boston Rent Control Admin., 6 Mass. App.
Ct. 135, 143-44, 374 N.E.2d 296, 301 (1978). But see Gregory v. City of San Juan
Capistrano, 142 Cal. App. 3d 72, 91, 85 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56 (1983) (citing Helmsley as
constitutionally requiring a return on value fair return formula). The courts in the
Oceanside and Cotati cases rejected San Juan Capistrano, noting that it had miscon-
strued Helmsley-a case that rejected the market value approach. Oceanside, 157 Cal.
App. 3d at -, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 247; Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 288, 195 Cal. Rptr. at
830-31.
239. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 267, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (1983), afl'd, - Cal. 3d -, 693
P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984). See infra Epilogue, at pp. 182-84 for a discussion
of the California Supreme Court decision.
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increases. The California Supreme Court is reviewing this decision.
No governing precedent exists on this issue.
In Helmsley, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that, if a
"steady erosion" of NOI occurred under rent control, the court may
find the law unconstitutionally confiscatory if landlords could not eas-
ily obtain individual rent adjustments. The court, however, did not
mandate full inflation indexing of regulated rents to guarantee a fair
return.2' In Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati,24 1 a
California appellate decision upholding the validity of a local residen-
tial rent control ordinance that guaranteed a landlord's "fair and rea-
sonable return on investment," the court noted that if the amount of
the landlord's net operating profit remains the same over time, the
landlord's return diminishes and rent control eventually becomes con-
fiscatory. Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, this court did not hold
that the NOI must be fully indexed against inflation to provide land-
lords a fair return.
In Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners'Association v. City of Ocean-
side, 22 the California Court of Appeal upheld the use of a maintenance
of NOI fair return formula when NOI is adjusted partially for inflation.
The challenged mobile home rent control ordinance provided for an-
nual adjustments of the lesser of the increase in the CPI or eight per-
cent. If that did not provide park owners a fair return, the mobile
home rent control ordinance entitled landlords to a NOI adjustment
equal to the lesser of the increase in the housing component of the CPI
or forty percent of the CPI since the 1979 base year. The court upheld
this formula as facially constitutional. The court rejected the chal-
lenger's assertions that only a fair return on value formula is constitu-
tional and that the NOI formula with only a partial inflation
adjustment is confiscatory.243
Assuming that the California Supreme Court upholds Fisher, the
case is unlikely to serve to invalidate Measure I. Fisher is premised
upon the procedural problems raised by Birkenfeld -requiring all of
Berkeley's residential landlords to seek inflation adjustments through
individual petitions to the BRSB. Because Measure I's fair return
formula provides an automatic, mandatory inflation adjustment and
240. Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 223, 394 A.2d at 76.
241. 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 293, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 834 (1983).
242. 157 Cal. App. 3d 887, -, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251-52 (1984).
243. Id. at -, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 245-53.
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only involves at most eighty-four hearings annually, the courts should
not apply the Fisher procedural rationale.
Two issues remain. Is Measure I facially invalid because it does not
guarantee expressly an adjustment for inflation? Fisher implies an af-
firmative answer.2 " In Birkenfeld and Carson, however, the California
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a rent control law must con-
tain a set fair return formula. Therefore, the courts must examine an
ordinance as applied.
Unlike Berkeley's residential rent stabilization fair return regula-
tions, the BBA not only has provided landlords with an inflation ad-
justment of NOI, but has made it automatic. This eliminates the
question of whether landlords can obtain discretionary adjustments
within a reasonable period. Left unanswered is the query whether
landlords are entitled constitutionally to full inflationary adjustments.
No court has yet upheld this assertion. Under the BBA's formula, the
BBA will adjust fully Elmwood landlords' median base NOI if the ap-
plicable CPI-U rises less than ten and one-half percent annually. This
is subject to the twenty-five percent overall annual adjustment ceiling.
Landlords are not entitled to an inflation adjustment beyond that ceil-
ing. Under the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning in Helmsley,
inflation must rise significantly beyond allowable general rent adjust-
ments for an extended period of time, therefore steadily eroding NOI,
before landlords can prove factually that their return is no longer fair.
Moreover, if a majority of Elmwood landlords failed to include infla-
tion escalator clauses in their leases before the adoption of Measure I, it
is difficult to see how landlords can assert forcefully that Measure I
should guarantee what the unregulated market did not provide.
c. Individual NOI versus Base Median NOI Adjustment
Landlords may assert that, regardless of the inflation adjustment
that the BBA allows, the BBA must adjust their individual base NOI
rather than the Elmwood district's base median NOI. No precedent
exists for review of this novel NOI formula. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the courts will recognize that the Constitution guarantees regu-
lated landlords a right to individualized treatment because rent control
statutes invariably involve uniform, rather than individualized, fair re-
turn formulas.
244. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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3. Speculative Financing
Measure I prohibits landlords from passing on to tenants the costs of
purchase financing or refinancing, except for capital improvements.245
This provision is intended to prohibit speculative landlords from pass-
ing on to tenants the costs of debt service during a period when rising
mortgage interest rates and rising real estate prices would result in
huge rent increases.
In Fisher, the court of appeal upheld the validity of a similar provi-
sion in Berkeley's residential rent stabilization law. Landlords asserted
that this prohibition violated California's statutory prohibition against
restraints on alienation of real property.246 Courts have interpreted
this prohibition to mean that only unreasonable restraints are inva-
lid.247 The Fisher court held that this statute does not apply to munici-
palities.248 Assuming that it applies, the court found that the
ordinance's guarantee of a fair return on investment provides an ade-
quate "safety valve."'249 The court's reasoning and conclusion apply
equally to Measure I to dispose of this contention.
4. Ceiling
The BBA imposed a twenty-five percent annual ceiling on all rent
adjustments, including NOI inflation adjustments.25 The BRSB im-
posed a fifteen percent ceiling on individual rent adjustments, including
those based upon the maintenance of NOI for a fair return.251 Both
boards allow landlords to collect any rent increases in excess of these
ceilings incrementally in successive years until the landlords receive
fully the adjustment to which they are entitled.
Landlords may assert that the imposition of this ceiling denies them
a fair return because it delays their actual enjoyment of their fair re-
turn. They may point to the California Court of Appeal decision in
245. MEASURE I, supra note 45, § 5(c)(i).
246. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 711 (Deering 1971).
247. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 948, 582 P.2d 970, 973,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1978). See generally Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America:
Invalidation of Automatically Enforceable Due-on-Sale Clauses, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 886
(1979).
248. Fisher, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
249. Id. at 301, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
250. See supra note 160.
251. See supra note 162.
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Pernell v. City of San Jose.2 52 In Pernell, the court invalidated a provi-
sion in San Jose's residential rent control ordinance that allowed hear-
ing officers to consider tenant hardship as a discretionary factor in
reviewing landlord petitions for special rent increases. The court ruled
that this provision denied landlords constitutional guarantees of a fair
return, equal protection, and amounted to a prohibited taking.253
The BBA's twenty-five percent annual ceiling also is designed to pre-
vent tenant hardship. Unlike the San Jose hardship clause, however,
this ceiling does not eliminate rent increases over the ceiling, but
postpones them. Additionally, the ceiling applies to all tenants. Land-
lords, therefore, cannot argue that the BBA discriminatorily aimed the
ceiling only at certain favored tenants.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the New York annual ceil-
ing of fifteen percent on fair return rent increases for commercial ten-
ants.254 In view of this precedent, the purpose of Measure I, and the
establishment of a twenty-five percent overall ceiling subject to admin-
istrative change, the BBA ceiling should survive constitutional chal-
lenges unless a landlord can prove drastic hardship attributable to the
ceiling.
G. Antitrust
Until 1978, municipal government enjoyed an implied exemption
from the coverage of federal antitrust laws under the "state action ex-
emption" that the United States Supreme Court established in Parker
v. Brown. 255 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.,256
the Supreme Court cut back on the Parker doctrine substantially when
it held that the state action exemption does not apply automatically to
anticompetitive municipal activity. In Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder,257 the Court held that a municipality must prove
that its activity constitutes action of the state in its sovereign capacity
252. 154 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 201 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1984).
253. Id. at -, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 730-32.
254. A.E.F r, 295 N.Y. at 385, 68 N.E.2d at 179. See supra note 91.
255. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1942).
256. 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978).
257. 455 U.S. 40, 48-51(1982). See generally Comment, MunicipalAntitrust Liabil-
ity: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 297 (1983). Whether active state supervision of municipal action is required
may be decided in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
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or is in furtherance or implementation of a clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy to justify its antitrust exemption.
These decisions may lead to landlord antitrust challenges to Measure I
and the rezoning of Elmwood.
1. Rent Stabilization
If municipal rent control exists by virtue of state authorization of
local option rent control, the Parker doctrine exempts municipal rent
control from the federal antitrust laws.258 California has not directly
authorized municipal rent controls, including Berkeley's Measure I.
California, in fact, consistently has rejected proposed legislation to reg-
ulate local rent regulation.2" 9 In Fisher, the California Supreme Court
presently is considering the antitrust issue.
Rent control opponents assert that local rent control constitutes ille-
gal price fixing, which has not and cannot be exempt from antitrust
prohibitions through state authorization. Proponents counter that mu-
nicipal price regulation, as distinguished from anticompetitive activity
of public enterprises, is not an illegal restraint of trade subject to the
antitrust laws. Even so, proponents contend that a voter initiative does
not constitute a price-fixing conspiracy and that local rent control does
not burden interstate commerce. Finally, opponents contend that,
even if these arguments fail, an indirect statutory authorization exists
for local rent control sufficient to invoke the Parker doctrine.260
The outcome of any antitrust challenge to Measure I depends upon
the California Supreme Court's response in Fisher. Irrespective of the
outcome, however, the courts may view commercial rent stabilization,
which protects businesses, as more susceptible to antitrust challenges
258. See Brontel, Ltd. v. City of New York, 571 F. Supp. 1065, 1070-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). The court held that New York City's local rent control regulations were exempt
from federal antitrust laws under Boulder because they were "in furtherance or imple-
mentation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." Id. at 1071.
The court also found that active state supervision was present. Id. at 1072 n.3 1. Subse-
quently, the State of New York assumed responsibility for administering New York
City's local rent controls. See supra note 181.
259. See W.D. KEATING, supra note 11. In 1984, the California Assembly passed
rent control legislation preempting local residential rent controls (A.B. 3808), but the
California Senate failed to vote on the bill.
260. Opponents rely primarily on the state statutory mandate for local housing ele-
ments to promote affordable housing. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65,580-81, 65,583
(Deering Supp. 1984). See generally Note, State and Federal Housing Policy vs. Local
Land Use Regulation: The New Conflict Between State and Municipal Powers in Califor-
nia, 15 U.S.F.L. REv. 509 (1981).
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than residential rent controls, which protect noncommercial tenants.
This question never arose during the life of New York's state-author-
ized commercial rent controls enacted after Parker.
2. Zoning
Challengers also may contend that Berkeley's rezoning of Elmwood
violates the antitrust laws on the ground that the density and develop-
ment controls, in combination with the quotas established for types of
businesses, constitute an illegal conspiracy between Elmwood
merchants and the city to establish a neighborhood monopoly for ex-
isting merchants. Such a challenge is unlikely to succeed.
Several pre-Lafayette and Boulder California cases rejected antitrust
challenges to local zoning. For example, in Ensign Bickford Realty v.
City Council of Livermore,261 the California Supreme Court upheld
zoning restrictions on the expansion of business on the ground that the
municipality's primary purpose was to regulate rational land use rather
than to create a business monopoly. Whether these cases retain prece-
dential value, however, remains unknown.
Because California cities receive their zoning power from the state,
the state delegation alone may satisfy the test propounded in Boul-
der.262 Moreover, the state has actively supervised local planning and
zoning by, for example, mandating various elements of local master
plans, reviewing these elements, and requiring consistency between lo-
cal zoning and general plans.263 Because the rezoning of Elmwood is
consistent with the goal of protection of neighborhood-serving com-
mercial districts in Berkeley's amended master plan, the rezoning ap-
pears to fall within this exemption.
The outcome of Fisher and post-Boulder antitrust challenges may
decide whether either Measure I or the Elmwood rezoning are suscep-
tible to antitrust challenges. Assuming that Measure I and the rezon-
ing of Elmwood are susceptible to antitrust challenges, landlords still
261. 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 479-80, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304, 311 (1977). See generally
Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIG. 33
(1962); Note, Antitrust and Zoning-How Much Respect for Local Government?, 22
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 901 (1982).
262. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65,100 (Deering Supp. 1984). The State requires
every city and county to establish a planning agency. The State requires them to pre-
pare and adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan. Id. § 65,300.
263. For example, the state specifies the content of the Housing Elements of local
general plans and mandates their review by the California Department of Housing and
Community Development. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 65,580-85 (Deering Supp. 1984).
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must overcome the heavy burden of proving the anticompetitive intent,
conduct, and impact of the city's regulatory actions in Elmwood. An
alternate outcome depends upon the success of the lobbying campaign
of municipalities seeking express exemption from the reach of federal
and state antitrust laws. 26
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. The Significance of the Elmwood Experiment
The significance of the Elmwood experiment lies in its test of the
efficacy of localized rent controls as a municipal antidisplacement strat-
egy. Elmwood, however, does not present the case of a gentrifying
neighborhood shopping district symptomatic of the gentrification of
surrounding residential neighborhoods. While the lower-income popu-
lation of these areas increasingly may be priced out of Elmwood if
Measure I fails, this alone is unlikely to decide the fate of their housing
pattern. It is more likely that their income, the price of that housing,
and other related factors such as the effectiveness of Berkeley's residen-
tial rent controls, are much more crucial. Indeed, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that commercial gentrification will begin only once a mar-
ket, either neighborhood-based or based regionally, is established. If
this is the case, commercial gentrification is most likely a symptom,
rather than a cause, of residential displacement. Assuming that com-
mercial rent control slows or stops commercial displacement in gentri-
fying shopping districts, its adoption still will not affect residential
displacement in Berkeley or elsewhere.
Whether the neighborhood is rich, poor, mixed, or in transition, the
Elmwood example illustrates the issues raised by the disappearance of
basic small, neighborhood-serving businesses vulnerable to dispropor-
tionate rent increases. Conventional planning techniques, including
zoning controls and historic preservation, often are inadequate to save
these businesses. Commercial rent stabilization may be a better public
policy if this is a city's goal. The Elmwood example provides insight
into the enormous complexities involved in the adoption and imple-
mentation of such a policy, even if in one tiny neighborhood. Selective
city-wide application of commercial rent stabilization, either by dis-
264. In October 1984, Congress granted local governments protection against mon-
etary damages and attorneys fees in actions brought against them or their officials acting
in an official capacity under the Clayton Act. See Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-554 (Oct. 24, 1984).
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trict, by type of business, or by both, presents even more complexities.
It remains to be seen whether much larger cities like New York City
and San Francisco will follow Berkeley's example.
Perhaps the most fascinating unanswered questions raised by the
Elmwood experience concern the political and economic motivations,
and the behavior of Elmwood's commercial tenants. The political ide-
ology of American small business owners has been very conservative
and antiregulatory. Berkeley is no exception. Whether merchant sup-
port for Measure I represents an exception, or is merely a temporary
expedient embraced solely for survival by some shopkeepers, is
unknown.
Likewise, it remains unknown to what extent the rent savings pro-
vided by Measure I have saved not only marginal small businesses from
involuntary relocation or liquidation, but also have resulted in reduced
prices or price increases, maintenance or improvement of services, or
other tangible benefits to the immediate customers of these businesses,
in addition to their survival in their present location. If Berkeley con-
tinues rent regulation, some tenants, particularly older proprietors
nearing retirement and unprofitable businesses, may sublet or sell to
new tenants and capitalize their rent savings. It remains unknown how
this will affect Elmwood's overall character.
B. Elmwood's Unanswered Questions
In addition to these questions and the unanswered legal issues ana-
lyzed above, the Elmwood experiment raises other unanswered ques-
tions. If Berkeley's future evaluations provide answers to these
questions, proponents and opponents of commercial rent stabilization
as a regulatory policy will be well-served.
Given the small scale involved, the feasibility of this approach is im-
portant, especially if it is expanded on a city-wide basis to other gentri-
fying neighborhood commercial areas. Feasibility issues include:
1) the rate of landlord compliance with the registration, rent increase,
and other regulatory requirements; 2) the success of BBA implementa-
tion of its novel fair return formula and its impact on landlords and
tenants; 3) landlords' use and the impact on existing and new tenants
of the banking provision for rent increases; 4) the impact on tenant
turnover, including subleases; 5) the impact on ownership, including
sales and transfers; 6) the impact on type of ownership, especially con-
version of commercial rental space to commercial condominiums;
7) the impact on rehabilitation and subdivision of existing space; 8) the
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BBA's administration of the law, its efficiency, and success in dispute
resolution; and 9) the city's cost of administration. 65
Over time, a careful evaluation of this experiment should provide
insight into these important issues. Measure I's success in saving Elm-
wood's smaller neighborhood-serving businesses will be known only af-
ter it has been in existence for several years.
C. Recommendations
Cities where neighborhood commercial displacement has become an
issue should consider carefully the Elmwood experiment and its les-
sons. The Elmwood experience suggests that land use controls alone
are insufficient to protect existing neighborhood-serving businesses.
They only discourage, and do not directly prevent, the entry of busi-
nesses that displace current tenants. Conversely, commercial rent sta-
bilization without density and land use controls is insufficient to
achieve this goal. Therefore, a tandem regulatory approach is
recommended.
If condominium conversions grow and threaten to displace tenants
unable to purchase their rented space, commercial condominium con-
version controls then may be required. While an absolute, permanent
ban may be unconstitutional, a variety of lawful conversion controls
should be considered.266 These include: 1) an annual ceiling on the
number or percentage of conversions; 2) special ameliorative require-
ments-for example, payment of relocation costs-if certain types of
businesses are displaced;267 and 3) inclusionary requirements-for ex-
ample, below-market purchase prices for long-term tenants unable to
265. Measure I empowers the BBA to charge fees. MEASURE I, supra note 45,
§ 8(b). The BBA has established a petition filing fee of $100 for the first unit and $20
for each additional unit in the same building.
266. For an analysis of various residential condominium conversion controls, see
generally Day & Fogel, The Condominium Crisis: A Problem Unresolved, 21 URBAN L.
ANN. 3 (1981); Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting
Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179 (1983);
Schlein, Government Regulation of Condominium Conversion, 8 ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
919 (1980); Note, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condomin-
ium Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U.L. REv. 955 (1983);
Comment, The Regulation of RentalApartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 507
(1979-1980).
267. California courts have upheld the validity of requiring relocation payments.
See, e.g., Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal. App. 3d 690, 693, 197 Cal. Rptr.
149, 151 (1983) (imposition of tenant relocation fees on landlords that convert apart-
ments to condominiums or other specified uses was within power of city).
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afford market prices.2 68
The adoption of a policy to encourage nonmarket ownership pro-
vides an alternative approach. Cooperatives provide one possibility.
Berkeley already has several retail cooperatives. Community Land
Trusts (CLTs) are one form of cooperative ownership.269 CLTs have
been created to promote neighborhood-based, non-profit community
ownership.27 In 1982, for example, the Northern California Land
Trust created a neighborhood CLT to purchase a five unit commercial
building in a gentrifying area of south Berkeley.271 A city not only can
promote this as a policy, but also can provide critical "seed" financing
and loan guarantees to make it more financially feasible for small busi-
nesses to form neighborhood cooperatives and CLTs.
If commercial rent stabilization is adopted, a targeted approach is
recommended. While geographical targeting is justifiable, it makes lit-
tle sense to regulate all landlords and tenants in a district like Elm-
wood. For example, Measure I gives the same protection to a branch
of California's largest and wealthiest commercial bank as it does to
small, family-owned businesses. This indiscriminate protection is
neither appropriate nor necessary.
A targeted approach, as illustrated by New York's proposed SBPA,
should protect only those small, neighborhood-serving businesses that
need protection most. The criteria for protection should include all or
some of the following: The type of neighborhood-serving business; the
size of rentable space; the number of employees; gross sales; and the
type of ownership.
Residential rent control precedent exists for this type of targeted reg-
ulatory approach. Luxury rental housing and landlords that own only
a few units typically are exempted from rent control regulation on the
grounds that wealthy tenants need no protection and that small-scale
landlords should remain unregulated.272 Landlords and tenants may
manipulate targeted exemptions and coverage provisions, and, there-
fore, cause administrative problems. These problems, however, are not
insurmountable, particularly at the Elmwood scale of regulation.
268. See supra note 34.
269. See generally California Consumer Cooperative Corporations, CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 12,200-704 (Deering Supp. 1984).
270. See INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMICS, THE COMMUNITY LAND
TRUST HANDBOOK (1982).
271. Berkeley Gazette, Sept. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
272. See supra note 228.
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More answers to the questions raised here will be forthcoming as
more is known about the use and impact of commercial rent stabiliza-
tion on neighborhood-serving businesses in gentrifying urban neighbor-
hoods like Berkeley's Elmwood district.
EPILOGUE
On December 27, 1984, the California Supreme Court decided
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, - Cal. 3d -, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1984). In a six-to-one decision the court upheld the constitution-
ality of Berkeley's residential rent control law (Measure D). The court
addressed many of the issues concerning the legality of Measure I dis-
cussed in this Article and resolved some of these issues.
Antitrust
The court held that Measure D did not violate sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. After reviewing Lafayette and Boulder, id. at -,
693 P.2d at 273-75, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 694-96, the court applied neither
the rule of per se illegality nor the rule of reason to the section 1 chal-
lenge. Instead, the court adopted a commerce clause test. The court
stated that municipal regulations are valid under section 1 if the regula-
tions are "rationally related to the municipality's legitimate exercise of
its police power and operates in an even-handed manner . . . unless
the plaintiff demonstrates that the city's purposes [can] be achieved as
effectively by means that [will] have a less intrusive impact on federal
antitrust policies." Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 286-87, 209 Cal. Rptr. 707-08.
Applying this test, the court concluded that municipal rent control
has a proper purpose and is rationally related to the legitimate exercise
of the municipal police power. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 287, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 708 (citing Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550
P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976). The court concluded that the
ordinance's exemptions did not constitute unreasonable discrimination.
Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 287-88, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09. Finally, the
court decided that the landlord-plaintiff suggested no equally effective
alternative to accomplish these legitimate local regulatory purposes by
means that would have a less intrusive impact on federal antitrust poli-
cies. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709. The court
applied the same test to the section 2 challenge and found no facial
violation of the Act. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 288-89, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
709-10. The court did not examine the extent of active state supervi-
sion of local rent control.
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Application of this test to Measure I most likely will result in a simi-
lar conclusion. As previously discussed, the alternatives to commercial
rent control will not achieve the purposes of Measure I, which appear
to meet the court's initial test. It is doubtful that the court will accept
the argument that its application to a single neighborhood is unreason-
ably discriminatory as long as it is applied in an even-handed manner.
Fair Return
First, the court announced that the "just and reasonable return on
property" requirement stated in Birkenfeld was not intended to articu-
late a constitutional fair return standard. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 291
n.35, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.35 (construing Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d 129,
550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976)). Second, the court repeated
its conclusion in Carson that no particular fair return formula is consti-
tutionally mandated. Id. at -, 693 P.2d 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
Third, it rejected the landlord's contention that a return on market
value formula is constitutionally required for a fair return. Id. at -,
693 P.2d at 290-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12. Fourth, the court re-
jected the facial challenge to measure D's fair return on investment
standard. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. It con-
cluded that the city could administer this standard to avoid confisca-
tory results. Id. The court based this conclusion on the following
considerations: 1) while landlords' profits may not be frozen indefi-
nitely, the BRSB was not prevented from adjusting landlords' base
NOI for inflation; 2) disparate treatment of individual landlords' in-
vestment does not constitute discrimination that violates equal protec-
tion; 3) the investment standard can be applied flexibly to treat
landlords' differing types of investment; and 4) a diminution of land-
lords' long-term appreciation in property value is not per se confisca-
tory. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 291-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-16. The
court found that Measure D's procedures for rent adjustments reme-
died the due process defects of its predecessor. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at
295-99, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716-20.
The court's analysis virtually guarantees that Measure I's fair return
on investment standard will pass constitutional muster on its face. As
applied, Measure I appears to meet the court's essential fair return re-
quirements: the procedural safeguards necessary to provide speedy re-
view of landlord rent adjustment petitions and periodic general
adjustment of landlords' NOI for inflation. Nevertheless, given the
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unique status of Measure I, only future judicial review will determine
the constitutionality of its fair return provisions.
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation
The court upheld Measure D's antispeculative restriction on the pass
through of post-rent control mortgage refinancing costs. Id. at -, 693
P.2d at 299-300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21. The court ruled that this
provision was not within the purview of and did not violate California's
statutory prohibition against unreasonable restraints against alienation.
Id. Therefore, Measure I's identical restriction does not constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Retaliatory Eviction
The court held that California law preempted Measure D's eviden-
tiary requirement for presumption of landlords' retaliatory violation of
the just cause for eviction protection. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 300-04, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 721-25. The just cause for eviction requirements were not
affected. Id. The court's invalidation of the presumption will have no
effect on Measure I because Measure I does not contain a similar
provision.
Rent Withholding
The court upheld Measure D's provision allowing tenants to with-
hold rent if landlords violate the law. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 304-12,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 725-32. Measure I has no such provision.
The court did not address the other issues previously discussed in
this Article.
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APPENDIX
Elmwood Commercial Rent Stabilization and Eviction Protection
Ordinance (No. 5468-N.S.):
Measure I
The people of the City of Berkeley do ordain as follows:
Section 1. Title:
This Ordinance shall be called the Elmwood Commercial Rent
Stabilization and Eviction Protection Ordinance.
Section 2. Purposes:
The purposes of this Ordinance are to protect commercial ten-
ants in the Elmwood district from rent increases which are not
justified by landlord's cost increases; to enable those tenants to
continue serving residents of the Elmwood district without undue
price increases, expansion of trade (which may exacerbate parking
problems), or going out of business; and to test the viability of
commercial rent stabilization as a means of preserving businesses
which serve the needs of local residents in Berkeley neighbor-
hoods, outside the downtown business district.
Section 3. Scope:
This Ordinance shall apply to all commercial premises (both
office and retail), rented or available for rent, only in the Elmwood
district of the City of Berkeley. The boundaries of this district are
as follows: Stuart Street on the north, Webster Street on the
south, Piedmond Avenue on the east, and Benvenue Avenue on
the west.
Section 4. Definition:
In this Ordinance, the following words and phrases have the
following meanings:
(a) Landlord: Any owner, lessor, sublessor, or other person en-
titled to receive rent for the use or occupancy of any rental
unit, or an agent thereof; provided, however, that the word
"landlord" shall not include any governmental agency.
(b) Rent: Any consideration (including any deposit, bonus, or
gratuity) demanded or received in connection with the use or
occupancy of any rental unit.
(c) Rental Unit: Any property, building, structure, or part
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thereof, or land appurtenant thereto, which is covered by
Section 3 of this Ordinance, together with all services con-
nected with the use or occupancy thereof.
(d) Services: Those services and facilities which enhance the use
of the rental unit, including but not limited to repairs, re-
placement, maintenance, painting, heat, hot and cold water,
utilities, elevator service, security devices and patrols, fur-
nishings, storage, janitorial and landscaping services, refuse
removal, insurance protection, parking spaces, and services
to and facilities in common areas of the building or parcel in
which the unit is located.
(e) Tenant: A tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee, or any other
person entitled to the use or occupancy of any rental unit.
(f) Consumer Price Index: The All Items Consumer Price In-
dex for All Urban Consumers, San Francisco-Oakland, Cali-
fornia, as published by the United States Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Section 5. Maximum Rent:
(a) No landlord of any rental unit covered by this Ordinance
shall request, demand, receive, or retain more than the maxi-
mum rent allowed by this section. The maximum rent shall
be the "base rent" plus any "allowable adjustments."
(b) "Base rent": Except as provided herein, base rent shall be
the lawful periodic rent in effect on October 1, 1981 (the ap-
proximate time the current campaign for commercial rent
stabilization in the Elmwood district began).
i) If, on October 1, 1981, the rental unit was held under a
lease which provided for fixed rental payment of varying
amounts (e.g., rents escalating with a Consumer Price In-
dex), then the base rent shall be the amount of the final law-
ful periodic rental payment required by such lease.
ii) If, on October 1, 1981, the rental unit was held under
a lease which provided rental payments whose amounts were
determined by gross sales, in whole or in part (whether or
not there is a fixed minimum rent), the monthly base rent
shall be the total amount of rent lawfully payable for the final
12 months of such lease, divided by 12 unless the landlord
notifies the tenant in writing at least 30 days before the lease
expires that the landlord chooses to continue the same provi-
sions for determining rent as were provided by such lease. If
the landlord so notifies the tenant, then such provisions shall
continue, provided, however, (1) that the rent shall not be
subject to the "allowable adjustment" allowed by this sec-
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tion, (2) that the landlord may thereafter abandon this
method of determining rent and use the other method pro-
vided by this subsection [(5)(b)(ii)] to determine the base rent
(adding any "allowable adjustments" to determine the "max-
imum rent"), but only upon 90 days prior written notice to
the tenant, and (3) that the landlord must abandon the gross
sales method of determining rent and shall use the other
method provided by this subsection [(5)(b)(ii)] to determine
the base rent (adding any "allowable adjustment" to deter-
mine the "maximum rent"), if the rental unit fails to sell or
produce substantially the same types of goods or services to
the community as it did on October 1, 1981.
(iii) If, on the date this Ordinance becomes effective, the
rental unit was held under a lease or rental agreement pro-
viding for fixed rental payments, and such rent has not been
raised in the 12 months prior to that date, then the base rent
shall be increased by the percentage of base rent which
equals the following amount: 5% times the number of years
(rounded off to the nearest year) between the date the rent on
the rental unit was last raised (before enactment of this Ordi-
nance) and the date this Ordinance becomes effective.
(iv) The base rent for any rental unit newly constructed
after October 1, 1981, or not rented on October 1, 1981, shall
be the lawful periodic rent actually charged for the first 12
months after the unit is rented. This method of establishing
base rent shall not be allowed, however, if the parcel on
which such new units is built contained, on October 1, 1981,
a rental unit covered by this Ordinance, which a newly con-
structed unit has replaced.
(c) "Allowable adjustments":
(i) The allowable adjustments shall be the unit's propor-
tionate share of increases in periodic costs, to the landlord,
since the end of the period used for determining the base rent
under subsection (b), or since the last allowable adjustment,
whichever is later. Such costs shall include costs of mainte-
nance and operating expenses, property taxes, fees in connec-
tion with the operation of the property, and improvements
(amortized over the useful life of each improvement). In-
creased costs due to increased principal or interest charges on
a loan shall not be allowed, however, where such increased
charges result from a larger loan being taken on the property
(as contrasted with increased charges resulting from in-
creases in prevailing rates of interest), whether due to refi-
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nancing by the landlord or purchase financing by a new
landlord.
(ii) No allowable adjustment shall be based on increased
costs incurred with the intent to evade any of the purposes of
this Ordinance.
(iii) The allowable adjustment shall not include an in-
crease in any cost which the tenant is already required to pay
by the terms of the lease on the rental unit (such as property
taxes and insurance).
(iv) Allowable adjustment shall become effective only if
the landlord gives the tenant at least 30 days prior written
notice that the landlord is imposing the adjustment and
thereby raising the rent. Such notice shall be served accord-
ing to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1162
or by any reasonable manner agreed upon by the parties.
The notice must specify the base rent, the costs which have
risen, including the amortization period used for any im-
provements, their amounts and the method of apportionment
among the units. The notice must advise the tenant that,
upon the tenant's request within 10 days, the landlord will
furnish documentary evidence of the base rent and increased
costs. If such request is made, the landlord shall furnish
such documentary evidence within 10 days after such re-
quest. If the landlord fails to furnish such evidence within 10
days, the notice of allowable adjustment shall become null
and void. The tenant's failure to request such evidence shall
not be deemed a waiver of his right to later contest the valid-
ity of the rent increase.
(d) If a rental unit is hereafter subdivided into 2 or more rental
units, then the base rents of the new units shall be deter-
mined by apportioning the base rent of the old unit and any
allowable adjustments among the new rental units according
to the square footage of each unit. If 2 or more rental units
are hereafter consolidated into 1 rental unit, then the base
rent on the new unit shall be the total of the base rents and
any allowable adjustments on the former units.
Section 6. Extraordinary Rent Increase:
(a) If the application of this Ordinance, or any section or part
thereof, would operate to violate the United States Constitu-
tion or California Constitution by denying a landlord a fair
and reasonable return on investment or by confiscating the
landlord's property, then such Ordinance, section, or part
thereof shall apply to such landlord only to the extent that it
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does not deny him a fair and reasonable return on investment
or confiscate his property.
(b) If a landlord believes a rent greater than is allowed by Sec-
tion 5 is necessary to provide him with a fair and reasonable
return on investment, such landlord shall petition for and ob-
tain a declaration from the Board of Adjustments that such
rent is permitted by this section, before increasing rent pur-
suant to this section.
(c) The Board of Adjustments shall enact regulations relating to
its duties under this Section, including the definition of "fair
and reasonable return on investment."
Section 7. Services, Lease Provisions, and Assignments:
(a) No landlord shall reduce or eliminate any service to any
rental unit covered by this Ordinance, unless a proportionate
share of the cost savings due to such reduction or elimination
is passed on to the tenant in the form of a decrease in rent.
Nor shall any landlord delete or modify any provision of any
existing or proposed lease or rental agreement, to the disad-
vantage of a tenant, unless the fair value of such deletion or
modification is passed on to the tenant in the form of a de-
crease in rent.
(b) No lease entered into after the effective date of this Ordi-
nance may contain any provision prohibiting or limiting the
tenant's right to assign the lease to a purchaser of the ten-
ant's business, except that a lease provision may condition
such assignment on the purchaser being at least as capable of
complying with the lease as the tenant, and a lease provision
may condition such assignment on the payment to the land-
lord of any necessary and reasonable expenses caused the
landlord by the assignment. No other payment to the land-
lord shall be required or made for his consent to the assign-
ment. Any consideration paid to the tenant, directly or
indirectly, for the transfer (by assignment, sublease, or other-
wise) of any lease or sublease of any rental unit or part
thereof shall be treated as part of the rent for the first month
of occupancy after the transfer and, as such, shall be subject
to the limitations on rent imposed by this Ordinance.
Section 8. Dispute Resolution:
(a) In case of any dispute over the meaning or application of any
provision of this Ordinance (except Section 9), a landlord,
tenant, or any other interested party or neighborhood organi-
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zation may petition the Board of Adjustments for resolution
of the dispute. Where the City Attorney determines that the
City of Berkeley or any neighborhood thereof is an interested
party, the City Attorney may petition or otherwise appear on
behalf of such party.
(b) Within a reasonable time after the effective date of this Ordi-
nance, the Board of Adjustments shall adopt rules and regu-
lations designed to assure prompt and fair resolution of
disputes which may arise under this Ordinance. Such rules
and regulations shall include provisions assuring that timely
notices of petitions and hearings shall be given to all affected
parties. Such rules and regulations may include a schedule
of reasonable fees to cover the cost of dispute resolution, and
may indicate which party shall be responsible for such fees.
The Board of Adjustments may thereafter amend, repeal,
and supplement its rules and regulations as it deems appro-
priate to assure prompt and fair resolution of disputes.
(c) The Board of Adjustments may delegate its powers to hold
hearings and render decisions under this section to groups of
one or more members of the Board, or to hearing officers,
with or without the right to appeal to the full Board, if such
delegation will help to assure prompt and fair resolution of
disputes.
(d) In any case in which the validity of any proposal or actual
rent increase under the Ordinance is in dispute, the burden
of proof shall be on the landlord to establish all facts which
show that the rent increase is allowed by this Ordinance.
(e) The Board of Adjustments may issue orders to enforce its
regulations and decisions.
(f) The decision of the Board of Adjustments shall be final, sub-
ject to the right of any party to seek judicial review in any
court of competent jurisdiction. Such review may be sought
by any affected landlord, tenant, the City of Berkeley, or any
interested party or neighborhood organization, whether or
not such party participated in the Board of Adjustments
proceedings.
(g) The Board of Adjustments may, from time to time as it
deems appropriate, adopt regulations which interpret various
provisions of this Ordinance.
(h) If the Board of Adjustments becomes aware that any pur-
pose of this Ordinance is being evaded or that it is not oper-
ating fairly toward landlords, tenants, or the community, the
Board shall promptly notify the City Council and may rec-
ommend that appropriate amendments to this Ordinance be
placed on the ballot.
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(i) The Board of Adjustments shall have the powers and duties
necessary to fulfill the purposes of this Ordinance.
Section 9. Evictions:
In any action to evict any tenant from any rental unit covered
by this Ordinance, the landlord shall plead and prove that the
landlord is in compliance with Section 5(a) of this Ordinance, and
that the action is being brought for one or more of the following
reasons, which were stated in the notice of termination:
(a) the tenant has failed to pay the lawful rent to which the land-
lord is entitled, and failed to comply with a valid notice to
pay or quit served pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1161;
(b) the tenant has substantially violated an obligation imposed
by the lease or rental agreement (other than an obligation to
surrender possession at the end of a term or upon notice) and
has failed to cure such violation within 10 days after having
received written notice thereof from the landlord;
(c) the tenant is committing or permitting to exist a nuisance in
the building or parcel, or is causing a substantial interference
with the comfort, safety, or enjoyment of the building or par-
cel by the landlord or other tenants;
(d) the tenant is using the rental unit for some illegal purpose;
(e) the tenant, who had a lease or rental agreement whose term
has expired, has refused (after receiving a request in writing)
to execute a written extension or renewal thereof for a fur-
ther term of like duration, containing provisions which are
not inconsistent with this Ordinance and are materially the
same as those in the previous lease or rental agreement;
(f) the tenant has refused to allow the landlord reasonable ac-
cess to the premises to make necessary repairs or improve-
ments, or to show the rental unit to a prospective purchaser,
mortgagee, or tenant;
(g) the landlord in good faith seeks to recover possession in or-
der to remove the rental unit from commercial use, after hav-
ing obtained all the necessary permits to do so; provided,
however, that if the landlord evicts for this reason and,
within one year thereafter, the rental unit is being used for
any commercial use, it shall be presumed that the landlord's
stated purpose in evicting was false, in any action by the ten-
ant against the landlord for abuse of process or malicious
prosecution of a civil action;
(h) the landlord in good faith seeks to recover possession in or-
der to repair code violations or improve the premises, after
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all necessary permits have been obtained, if it is not feasible
to perform such repairs or improvements while the tenant
remains in possession; provided, however, that when the re-
pairs or improvements are completed, the landlord shall so
notify the tenant and allow the tenant 30 days in which to
decide whether or not to return to the premises.
Section 10. Retaliation:
No landlord shall in any way retaliate against any tenant for the
tenant's assertion or exercise of any right under this Ordinance.
Such retaliation shall be a defense in any action to evict the tenant
and shall be subject to suit for actual and punitive damages, in-
junctive relief, and attorney's fees. The tenant need not exhaust
any remedy before the Board of Adjustments prior to raising such
defense or filing such suit. In any action wherein such retaliation
is at issue, where the action was filed within 6 months of the ten-
ant's assertion or exercise of rights, the burden shall be on the
landlord to prove that the dominant motive for the act alleged to
be retaliatory was some motive other than retaliation.
Section 11. Remedies:
(a) If a landlord attempts to increase rent under Section 5(c),
and any of the information in the notice of rent increase or
supporting documentary evidence is false, inaccurate, mis-
leading, or incomplete in any material way, then the notice of
rent increase shall be null and void. If, in addition, it is
proved that the landlord acted knowingly and willfully in
providing such false, inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete
information or evidence, then the landlord shall pay the ten-
ant, as penalty, three times the amount of rent demanded in
the notice of rent increase.
(b) Any affected tenant shall recover actual damages whenever
the landlord receives or retains any rent in excess of the max-
imum amount allowed under this Ordinance, and whenever
the landlord violates any eviction provision of this Ordi-
nance. If, in addition, it is proved that such act was in bad
faith, the landlord shall pay the tenant, as a penalty, three
times the actual damages.
(c) If a tenant fails to bring a civil or administrative action
within 120 days of any violation of this Ordinance, then such
action may be brought on the tenant's behalf by the City of
Berkeley or any interested party or neighborhood organiza-
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tion, which shall retain one-half of any amount awarded in
such action or received in settlement of such action.
(d) No exhaustion of the administrative remedies provided in
Section 8 shall be required as a precondition to invoking any
remedy provided by this section.
(e) In any action wherein any party succeeds in obtaining any
remedy, in whole or in part, under this section, such party
shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. If a party asserts
a remedy under this section and fails to obtain any relief
whatsoever, then the prevailing party shall be awarded rea-
sonable attorney's fees.
Section 12. Waiver:
No provision in any lease, rental agreement, or agreement made
in connection therewith, which waives or diminishes any right of
the tenant under this Ordinance, is valid.
Section 13. Application to Pre-[E]xisting Leases:
(a) This Ordinance shall not operate to change any provision in
any fixed-term (as opposed to month-to-month) lease exe-
cuted before October 1, 1981, and in effect on the date this
Ordinance is enacted. Whenever such a lease expires, how-
ever, this Ordinance shall thereupon apply to the affected
rental unit; provided, however, that if such lease is renewable
at the landlord's or tenant's option, and such option is exer-
cised, this Ordinance shall not apply to the rental unit until
the renewed lease expires.
(b) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) above, any
lease in effect on the date this Ordinance is enacted, which
lease was executed since one year prior to October 1, 1981,
which increased the rent over the prior rent by more than the
increase in the Consumer Price Index from the date the prior
rent became operative to the date such lease was executed,
shall have its rent reduced immediately to the prior rent, plus
such increase in the Consumer Price Index. The purpose of
this subsection is to preserve certain businesses which have
recently received such high rent increases that they would-
but for this subsection-find it necessary to take steps contrary
to the purposes of this Ordinance, as set out in Section 2.
This subsection shall not operate to deprive any landlord of a
fair return on investment.
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Section 14. Partial Invalidity:
If any provision of this Ordinance or any application thereof is
held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provision or
application of this Ordinance which can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions
of this Ordinance are declared to be severable.
Section 15. Effective Date:
This Ordinance shall become effective on the date it is enacted.
Section 16. Evaluation:
At the end of each year this Ordinance is in effect, the Compre-
hensive Planning Department shall report to the City Council on
the effectiveness of this Ordinance in carrying out the purpose set
out in Section 2. This report shall also identify any other positive
or negative effects of the Ordinance and may make recommenda-
tions concerning whether the Ordinance should be left in opera-
tion or repealed and whether the scope of the Ordinance should be
expanded to include other neighborhood shopping districts in the
City of Berkeley, outside the downtown business district.
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